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ABSTRACT
An Anthropological Analysis of
Wolfhart Pannenberg and Karl Rahner with Regard to
God's Universal Will to Salvation
by
Anthony Joseph Ferriell
As Western cultures have become increasing pluralized
religiously in the twentieth century, Christian theologians
have raised the question whether they should engage in
dialogue or evangelism with communicants from other faiths.
Between these polarities there have been other solutions
offered. Two very prominent ones which have gained viability
in the theological arena have been the ideas of Wolfhart
Pannenberg and Karl Rahner. Both theologians have maintained
an exclusivism with regard to the supremacy of Christian
revelation. Yet, how they have maintained the supremacy of
the content has been radically different.
Both theologians are sympathetic to dialogue with other
religions. Within this dialogue, however, they do not want
to sacrifice the ultimate truth claims of Christian
revelation. In so doing this, they have sought to formulate
the supremacy of Christian revelation in relation to other
religions without being condemnatory. As such, Pannenberg
has sought to develop the idea of how Jesus Christ is the
explicit fulfillment and anticipation of the history of
religions. Rahner, on the other hand, has sought to develop
the idea of how the Christian revelation is implicitly
mediated through the historical reality of other religions.
It is, then, the purpose of this thesis to examine and
critique the insights of these theologians in relation to
their anthropological thought. It will attempt to examine
whether in arguing for the supremacy of Christian revelation
with other religions if an implicit or explicit proclamation
should be maintained with regard to the salvific purposes of
Christ. Is it sufficient, given what is known about human
nature, to say that there can be an anonymous appropriation
of Christ's salvific work? Or, is an explicit and cognitive
adherence of Christian revelation necessary for the
appropriation of Christ's work?
The first chapter will, then, seek to understand
Pannenberg and Rahner
'
s thought on human sinfulness and self-
alienation. This will be done in order to find a basis of
understanding what it is in regards to that humans are in
need of salvation.
The second chapter will examine their views with regard
to the idea of coming to understand one's sinfulness and
self-alienation through critical sel f -r ef 1 ect ion . This will
be done for the purpose of seeing whether humanity is capable
of realizing their lostness apart from an external
revelat ion.
The third chapter will examine Rahner's understanding of
the way toward the appropriation of salvation in Christ. It
will seek to do so with a critique and analysis of its inner
coherence and theological soundness.
The fourth chapter examine Pannenberg 's understanding of
the way to the appropriation of salvation in Christ. It will
be done with a comparative analysis and critique with that of
the ideas of Rahner.
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1CHAPTER 1
Most religions of the world recognize that there is
something fundamentally and basically wrong with the nature
of unconver t ed or unenl i ght ened human existence. "They all
recognize... that ordinary human existence is defective,
unsatisfactory, lacking. "i This chapter will then examine
the understanding Pannenberg and Rahner have of humanity's
defective existence.
Pannenberg notes that the understanding of the human
dilemma is one which has shifted from a reference to God, to
one that emphasizes the problem of humanity in relation to
itself. The problem has been framed in more of an
anthropocent r i c thematic, rather than a theocentric one. 2
One model of this shift can be seen in the comparative views
of Augustine and Kierkegaard. Both of these thinkers are
Christian, and both portray an acute and convicting analysis
of the problems of the natural human condition. Yet, since
Kant cut the moral nature of humanity away from the order of
nature , � anthropological analysis has had to interpret itself
more in reference to the immediate effects apart from the
1 John Hick, An Interretat ion of Religion (1989; rpt..
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 32.
2 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological
Perspective, trans. Matthew J. O'Connel (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1985), 95.
3 Albert Schweitzer, The Philosophy of Civilization,
trans. C.T. Campion (Buffalo: Promethius Books, 1987), 182.
2ultimate causes.'*
For example, in Augustine's analysis, human defection is
thought both in terms of its ultimate cause and immediate
effects, where as for Kierkegaard, it is construed more in
terms of its immediate effects on the human condition. s The
presuppos i t i onal shift, with the Kantian reformation, has
made this thematic shift of emphasis which Kierkegaard takes
necessary for the Christian theologian to relate meaningfully
in the modern theological context.
Rahner and Pannenberg both feel compelled, so to speak,
to go the way of Kierkegaard in their anthropological
analysis. Given that modern science and a large portion of
theologians have not for a long time worked with a God-
centered universe or existence. Christian theology must be
done and proved on secularist's grounds. In other words,
Pannenberg and Rahner both see the need to give Christian
content a basis of proof and plausibility from secular data.
Pannenberg states:
The aim is to lay theological claim to the human
phenomena described in anthropological disciplines. To
this end, the secular description is accepted as simply
as a provisional version of the objective reality, a
version that needs to be expanded and deepened by
showing that anthropological datum itself contains a
further and theologically relevant dimension. 6
4 Pannenberg, 104.
5 Pannenberg, 104.
6 Pannenberg, 19-20.
3Rahner in this regard elaborates as such:
Theology is a theology that can be genuinely preached to
the extent it succeeds in establishing contact with the
total secular sel f -understanding which man has in a
particular epoch, succeeds in engaging conversation with
it, in catching onto it, and in allowing itself to be
enriched by it in its language and even more so in the
very matter of theology itself. ^
So to delimit the focus of topical analysis, the
foundation will be laid for understanding Pannenberg and
Rahner's anthropology with the problem of human alienation.
The concept of human alienation was really popularized
by Karl Marx. Alienation in the Marxian sense was thought in
terms of economic and social categories brought by the ill
effects of capitalism. According to Marx material wealth is
the sum value of human existence. Capitalism as an economic
system creates conditions whereby material wealth is placed
imporpor t i onat e 1 y in the possession of the minority
bourgeois, at the expense of the mass proletariat. This
system in turn creates societal discontent since material
wealth or property is a social and not an individual
coimnodity. Thus capitalism, with its system of private
ownership breeds al i enat i on of the proletariat from the
material wealth which is rightfully theirs. 8
Pannenberg notes that the "more socio-psychological
7 Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, trans.
William V. Dych (New York: Cross Road, 1978), 7-8.
8 William S. Sahakian and Mabel Lewis Sahakian, Realms
of Philosophy (Cambridge: Schenkman Pub. Inc., 1965), 208.
discussion of the concept of alienation has to large extent
psychologized the Marxist concept... and reduced it to a
subjective feeling of es t rangement . 9 The discussion and
interpretation of the phenomena of psychological alienation
is colored by various nuances of meaning and anthropological
interpretations. Because of the concepts great variation of
ideas and meanings, Israel states that he would prefer to
discard the term al together . i o Great complexity is bound to
occur with the evolution of any widely used concept, however.
For that reason, then, this thesis will interact with the
concept of al i enat ion as a categorical means of understanding
human fall eness .
With the idea of alienation and its concurrent symptom
of a "subjective feeling of estrangement" in mind. Guinness
offers an elaborated definition from which to work. He
writes: "Whenever a man is not fulfilled by his own view of
himself, his society or his environment, then he is at odds
with himself and feels estranged, alienated and called into
question. "11 Guinness
'
s description emphasizes a cognitive
approach when he speaks of man being unfulfilled due to what
could be called a faulty world-view. Alienation occurs when
9 Pannenberg, 274.
10 Pannenberg, 274.
11 Os Guinness, The Dust of Death (Downers Grove:
Intervarsity Press, 1973), 25.
5one's view of self, society, and the surrounding' environment
does not fulfill one's ontological nature and true identity.
This conceptual perspective can be distinguished from a
more existential or ontological based approach. This is an
approach represented by Tillich. Tillich writes that
alienation is caused by unbel i ef which is what he understands
as "the act or state in which man in the totality of his
being turns away from God. "12 The "totality of being" here
refers to man's knowledge, will, and emotions. Yet, this
estrangement is predicated not on a cognitive volition or
predisposition, but is rather founded on the very nature of
ontological existence.
For instance Tillich states:
Unbelief is the disruption of man's cognitive
participation in God. It should not be called the
"denial' of God. Questions and answers, whether
positive or negative, already presuppose the loss of a
cognitive union with God... Unbelief is the separation
of man's will from the will of God. It should not be
called "disobedience'; for command, obedience, and
disobedience already presuppose the separation of will
from wi 1 1 . 1 3
Here it is seen that the separation of humanity from God, or
the ground of all being is integral to authentic existence
and God's purposeful communication. "In his existential
self-realization he turns toward himself and his world and
loses his essential unity with the ground of his being and
12 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Chicago:
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1957), 2: 47.
13 Tillich, 47-48.
6his world." Again: "It is freedom and destiny in one and the
same act. Man, in actualizing himself, turns to himself and
away from God..."i4
In reflection, Guinness seems too cognitive in his
definition, and Tillich too onto 1 ogi cal . i s Nevertheless,
both men provide two valid polar conceptions with which to
think of the phenomenon of alienation. Therefore, in dealing
with the concept of alienation, it will be viewed and
analyzed in polar tension between the cognitive and
ontological definitions given. Pannenberg and then Rahner
will be examined individually within this framework. The
examination will be done with the traditional theological
categories of sin or concupiscence and guilt. This will be
followed by a review, contrast, and analysis of the
respective positions.
Pannenberg has a good deal of respect for Augustine's
understanding of concupiscence. Pannenberg thinks Augustine
stresses more clearly than most modern theologians both the
origin and the effect of sin.
The relative superiority of Augustine's teaching of sin
becomes clear from the fact that it allows us to do
justice to both... the empirical manifestation of sin
and its radical character, the full discovery of which
is only made possible by the light of grace. i6
14 Tillich, 47.
15 The reason for this will become evident through the
course of the thesis.
16 Pannenberg, 93.
7In the City of God Augustine describes concupiscence as a
desire for things in a depraved and disordered way. It
inverts the created order of nature by turning high things
low and the low things high. it It is a perverted desire for
the temporal above the eternal, the creation over the
creator. Here Augustine shares: "These inferior goods have
their delights, but are not comparable to my God who made
them all. It is in him that a just person takes delight; he
is the joy of those who are true of heart. "i*
For Augustine, then, sin is not merely a matter of wrong
or unethical choices, but is rather a very distortion in
character of the nature of being. At its root is an
"arrogant claim to ungrounded superiority" which ascribes the
origin of things to the ego rather than being attached "to
the real origin of things. "i9 What leads one to
concupiscence is pride. The pride in humanity is manifested
as a claim to a position of importance that is unwarranted.
It is the denial of subservience to God. This Augustine
calls superbi a. It is the distortion of super bi a in the
Augustinian analysis which provokes people to cupidi tas : a
perverse will to sin. 20
17 Augustine, City of God, trans. J.W.C. Wand (London:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1963), XII: 6.
18 Augustine, Confess i ons . trans. Henry Chadwick
(London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992), II: 10.
19 Pannenberg, 88.
20 Pannenberg, 87.
8Pannenberg respects the Augustinian analysis for its
psychological realism and subtlety of perception. He sees
value in the Augustinian analysis in that it shows sin to be
a "distortion of our relation to the world and to ourselves."
Also, Augustine has shown that this estrangement "takes place
for long periods more or less unnoticed, being simply
implicit" in human cons c i ousness . 2 i Yet, Pannenberg realizes
that Augustine's formulation, for all of its merits is not
completely valid for modern consciousness. The reason is
that it embraces a presupposition of a hierarchical order
contained in the universe. This is "an order in which
everything comes forth from God and strives to return to
him. "22 As Pannenberg states:
(T)he modern era has made the knowledge of nature
independent of the idea of God and in so doing has
deprived this conception of a universal natural order of
its claim to validity as a fundamental philosophical
principle. Reflection on the divine origin of nature,
if entertained at all, is regarded as secondary to the
knowledge of nature provided by the natural sciences. 23
With this acknowledgment, however, Pannenberg marvels that
the modern psychological descriptions of human alienation are
fundamentally in accord with Augustine's analysis. 24 This
analysis is rooted in the idea of the preference given to the
21 Pannenberg, 94.
22 Pannenberg, 94.
23 Pannenberg, 94.
24 Pannenberg, 95.
9self-centered ego over living authentically in reference to
one's meaningful destination.
For a more contemporary analysis, Pannenberg finds
particular value in Kierkegaard's analyses of anxiety and
dread in relation to the idea of sin more effective for the
presuppositions of modern consciousness. Kierkegaard sees
human beings as a synthesis of finite and infinite reality.
This idea is gathered from the fact that people, though
obviously finite given their numerable limitations, are able
to transcend to a certain degree their own barriers of
constraint. This is seen in humanity's exocentr ici ty or
openness to the world which makes humans qualitatively
distinct from all other animals. 25
This is particularly manifested in sel f -consciousness .
This is descriptive of the spirit of a person which forms a
synthesis with the body and derives out of this unity self-
conscious identity. 26 Yet, the ground of this synthesis of
identity is not composed within the human self. Its ground
is constituted in something other than the self. So, when a
person tries to actuate self in freedom and self-
authentication, Kierkegaard states that this will ultimately
lead into a despai r ing to be oneself. "That self which he
despairingly wishes to be is a self which he is not; what he
25 Pannenberg, 97.
26 Pannenberg, 98.
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really wills is to tear his self away from the power which
constituted it . "2 t
The human person knows a priori that freedom has its
reality in him. This is not able to be actualized by the
self-will since freedom is not solely grounded in self. Due
to this realization of the possibility of freedom springs
dread and anxiety. The only way to escape anxiety and
achieve freedom is to posit one's identity in the ground of
its very being. This ground for Kierkegaard is God. The way
to posit one's being in freedom in God is through faith.
"Faith is: that the self in being itself is grounded
transparently in God. "28 Freedom for Kierkegaard is not the
possibility of being able to choose good from evil. As
Pannenberg clarifies, it is "identical with the spirit, with
the eternity that is present in the
"
instant '. "2 9
With this brief backdrop on the ideas of sin and
concupiscence in the thought of Augustine and Kierkegaard, a
base has been layed for which to contrast and distinguish
Pannenberg' s conceptions against these classical thinkers.
Pannenberg has great appreciation for the ideas of
Augustine and Kierkegaard in understanding the rootedness of
27 Pannnenberg, 98.
28 Soren Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, trans, and
intro. by Walter Lowrie (1941; reprint, Princeton: Princeton
Univ. Press. 1951), 132.
29 Pannenberg, 101.
11
sin in human nature. He does not believe, however, that the
classical traditions were able to grasp the voluntary
character of sin.30 if sin is rooted in human nature, and it
is an inevitability of existence, then Pannenberg argues that
it cannot be called sin. "The concept of sin is inseparable
from the ideas of responsibility and guilt. [This causes]
the most serious objection against linking the idea of sin to
the natural conditions of human ex i s t ence . " 3 i
To avoid this problem without negating the truth which
lies in the classical formulations of sin, Pannenberg makes a
critical clarification in the understanding of sin in
relation to human nature. In a seemingly paradoxical
statement Pannenberg writes that "even if human beings are...
sinners by nature, this does not mean that their nature as
human beings is sinful. "32 in this statement the
understanding of human nature has two conceptions. One is
the idea that humans are sinful by nature in virtue of the
fact that the limitations of their natural condition
restricts human exocent r i c i ty . Human limitations come into
conflict with openness leaving the inevitable conflict of
anxiety and sin.
Pannenberg, however, is emphatic to insist on a second
30 Pannenberg, 108.
31 Pannenberg, 110.
32 Pannenberg, 107.
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way of looking at this. This is that human nature, meaning
human essence or essentiality of being, as thought of in the
ideas of self-consciousness, exocent r i c i t y , etc., does not
cause a person to be sinful. 3 3 Pannenberg contends that the
giveness of self-love or human finitude in congruence with
exocentr i ci ty will not automatically lead a person to sin.
Again, it cannot be so since sin implies responsibility, and
the classical conception of human sinfulness does not do
justice to the issue of responsibility.
For sin to be sin, it has to be a responsible act
committed by a person's conscious self. The proper question
at this point is in what way does Pannenberg more explicitly
develop the idea that humanity is sinful by nature, though
this nature is not sinful in itself. This is resolved by
Pannenberg' s development of what could be understood as an
eschatalogi cal orientation of human nature. 34 Pannenberg
describes this orientation in this fashion:
The essential nature is... not something that is always
and everywhere [the same], but rather as something that
is to characterize all the manifestations of human life
insofar as human beings are to be human and live in
keeping with their destination as human. The essential
concept of the human person is an ought' concept, not,
however, one that is applied extr ins i cal ly to the actual
living of human life but one that is operative in the
exocentric structure of this life. 35
33 Pannenberg, 107.
34 The reason why this writer uses this idea will
become more evident as the thesis proceeds.
35 Pannenberg, 108.
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Here Pannenberg places human nature in a tension of the
what is and the what ought to be. "Human beings are given
their "what they are,
' but only in the form of a task to be
completed. "3 6 Humanity, in Pannenberg ' s view, is put within
the task to fulfill a destiny which is beyond the giveness of
their innate limitations. Within this tension between human
destiny and human confinement, the will of the individual
comes into play to either affirm or deny that which God calls
the individual to, beyond limitation and confinement.
A crucial question, however, for grasping Pannenberg's
doctrine of sin and responsibility relates to the issue of
where the possibility for human freedom is derived. Off
hand, Pannenberg rejects the idea of responsibility construed
in terms of independent authorship of an action which is
indifferent to the circumstances which surround a choice. He
thinks that to speak of responsibility in terms of causality,
whether primary or secondary, places ethics into the realm of
removing responsibility as much as explaining it. "Those who
are the authors of actions may well refuse responsibility...
by showing the motives that led to the actions; the closely
woven net of motives can always be used to show why the
actions had to occur as they did. "37
Rather, Pannenberg would concur with Ricoeur, when he
36 Pannenberg, 108.
37 Pannenberg, 112.
14
states: "Man had the consciousness of responsibility before
having had the consciousness of being cause, agent,
author. "38 Pannenberg contends that this "consciousness of
responsibility" only comes when a moral imperative
corresponding to a moral action becomes a part of the agents
ident i ty .
Responsibility and the demand or expectation of
responsibility have their basis in legal or moral
imperatives that prescribe what the character of my
action ought to be. But these imperatives are binding
only if they are accepted by agents as conditions for
their own identity. 39
Pannenberg is here concerned that his readers understand that
true ethical relation to a person must be understood in terms
of ownership of the imperative, rather than forced behavior.
Pannenberg states that "mankind... is never finally
determined in the sense of a fixed concept of human essence;
in contrast to animals, humans are essentially "open'. "4"
The essence of humanity is still a task to be completed, and
as has been shown by behavioral anthropology, "man must
always orient his drives.
" Since then human nature is still
in the process of formation and cannot be locked into any
fixed and permanent system, Pannenberg then seeks to
understand human nature in its most concrete form, its
38 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans, by
Emerson Buchanan (New York: Harper & Row Pub., 1967), 102.
39 Pannenberg, 113.
40 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Ethics . trans, by Keith Crim
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1981), 40.
15
history.
In this regard Pannenberg writes that "human nature is
the history of the realization of human destiny. "�'i Thus, no
mode of moral conceptua 1 i ty can be legitimately placed on a
person outside of his specific framework of historical
realization and exposure. This is a critical point.
Pannenberg does not believe that a moral command is
necessarily a part of a person's specific constitution. A
moral imperative must be accepted as a part of one's identity
before the human person can be responsible for it.
Otherwise, if a person has not seen the moral imperative in
relation to sel f -ident i ty, it has no real or actual
correspondence to the person as a binding quality of
obedi ence .
What, then, does Pannenberg see to be morally binding
for the human subject without violating the subject's
freedom? There are two basic answers to this question: one
is related to a formal freedom and the other to a real
freedom. Formal freedom for Pannenberg is similar to the
Socratic notion that people are always free to choose what
they perceive as good for them. In fact, they always choose
in congruence to that perception. This is for Pannenberg
what he means by formal freedom.
As Pannenberg expresses: "(T)he persons making the
41 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Human Nature. Election, and
Hi story (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977 ), 24 .
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choice cannot but regard the object chosen as a good;
otherwise they would not have chosen it. "''2 He argues that
it is impossible to choose aga i ns t the good or aga i ns t God.
The reason for this is that God is "the ground of the
person's own future selfhood and therefore as the very
embodiment of all that is good.''''^ One cannot explicitly
reject God or the good; that person can only enclose himself
in his own finitude.
When a person does, however, appear to explicitly reject
God, this is because that person perceives the idea of God as
being a merely human construct. On the other hand, when one
believes God to be real and rejects His commandments, "this
is due to doubt whether this or that is in fact God's
will. "44 Pannenberg even believes that one who is compelled
to act by an addiction or compulsive behavior chooses
according to what that person perceives to be in his best
interest in the moment of the choice. 45
With all of this, Pannenberg is in no way to be
construed as a moral relativist. He writes that "it is
possible... that the persons choosing are mistaken about what
is good for them." 46 He realizes that the perception of
42 Pannenberg, Anthro . . 117.
43 Pannenberg, Anthro . , 116.
44 Pannenberg, Anthro . . 116.
45 Pannenberg, Anthro . . 117.
46 Pannenberg, Anthro . . 117.
17
what is good may be objectively in error, nonetheless the
perceiver believes the choice to be in his best interest, and
thus acts accordingly. The objective law of God may be
realized, and perhaps agreed to, but the person agreeing may
nonetheless be
inclined either to regard his directives as not applying
to our situation or even to doubt that such laws can
have God's authority behind them, once the content of
his demands is in opposition to a fixed behavioral
orientation based on instinct-47
Also Pannenberg addresses the severity of choosing an
objective wrong when it appears subjectively good:
Only the power of the lie that says that good is evil
and evil good and deceptively offers us life as the
reward for sin--only this deceitful character of sin
enables us to understand how, even though the power to
choose remains intact from the formal standpoint, human
beings can nonetheless choose what is objectively evil,
and choose it not through negligence but by
compul s i on . 4 8
So it is seen that formal freedom, as Pannenberg
understands it, is the power which enables a person to choose
what is felt to be for his own good, whether right or wrong.
Yet, this is not the only freedom by which humanity
acts. There is also what Pannenberg refers to as real
freedom. This is the freedom which enables one to fulfill
one's eschatalogi cal destiny.
Real freedom is a call or suoomons given to a person to
full selfhood and identity. It is not a call to make a
47 Pannenberg, Anthro . . 117-18.
48 Pannenberg, Anthro . . 118.
18
choice whether one does or does not want selfhood, though.
It is a summons which is grounded in God, and with it comes
the realization of responsibility and meaning. "The call to
freedom is always to a harmonization of ones
'
s behavior with
one's own destiny. This call is therefore... not a freedom
to choose between good and its opposite. "49 Neutrality of
decision is more related to ambivalence and non- i dent i t y -
Actual freedom is empowerment to be as one should be.
Pannenberg's idea of real freedom will be more fully
explored in the second chapter of this thesis. It is
important for now, at least, to know that human beings
function under two modes of realization in order to
understand Pannenberg's concept of responsibility for sin and
its relation to guilt. The first is formal freedom which
allows a person to act according to that which is relatively
thought to be for personal good. The second is real freedom
which allows one to act according to what is in fact for
personal good, in keeping with destiny and selfhood.
The question now arises as to where real responsibility
and culpability for evil actions lie within this volitional
scheme. For how can one be blamed for wrong doing when he
cannot help what he does, since it is always at the moment
conceived of as the perceived good? or when one does lead a
good and a self-fulfilled life, is it not merely because
49 Pannenberg, Anthro . . 116.
19
that one was summoned to the realization to do so? These and
other questions like them will be answered later. Suffice it
now, though, to turn Pannenberg's understanding of guilt and
al i enat i on .
Pannenberg distinguishes the concepts of alienation and
guilt in a functional sense, but relates them in an affective
understanding. Pannenberg, referring to alienation in the
fashion of Guinness, writes: "The state of alienation makes
itself known to human beings in feelings of malaise and
discontent or of anxiety and general depress ion. "5 o Guilt
consciousness, on the other hand, is what Pannenberg
describes, as the height of affective alienation "when the
tribunal of my own conscience condemns me."5i
He elaborates further that alienation has a more
indeterminate root, where as guilt is the opposite.
Alienation, for instance, is made known to people through
feelings. The root of its cause is deeper. Alienated
persons feel as they do by the "fact [of being] removed from
their true selves and pushed into questioning their
identity. "52 This loss of identity occurs when individuals
feel themselves locked out of their destiny and exocentric
orientation, and pushed back upon their egos, merely reduced
50 Pannenberg, Anthro . . 285.
51 Pannenberg, Anthro . . 285.
52 Pannenberg, Anthro . . 285.
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to them. This, however, is not an instantaneous or
immediately conscious process.
The process of alienation may begin as a separation from
a specified counterpart, but it tends to a generalized
state of estrangement and apartness in which the ego
falls back upon itself. The indet erminancy is essential
to the feeling of s e 1 f -al i enat i on in particular. In the
indeterminate feeling of personal non-identity the
identity that is lacking is not grasped clearly, and for
this reason the non-identity too remains vague. 53
What has just been described falls largely in line with
what has earlier been described regarding Pannenberg's view
of sin causing alienation to people's identities through loss
of destiny into egocent r i c i t y . This, as Kierkegaard, too,
suggests, causes several affective disorders. Yet, its
nature is indeterminate due to its relation to non-identity.
Pannenberg's thought here appears consistent with his
analysis of human blindness to sin. An entering into self-
alienation through non-identity is premised on ignorance of
true identity for Pannenberg.
The stage has been set to inquire how can guilt
consciousness be derived from mis-apperception caused by
unavoidable ignorance. Consciousness of guilt is
distinguished from alienation, according to Pannenberg, due
to its determinancy. This determinancy is based on the
violation of a norm by a culpable individual. This
culpabi 1 i ty
implies that... there is a clear knowledge not only of
53 Pannenberg, Anthro . . 286.
21
personal identity and the demands that this identity
makes on personal behavior but also of the person's own
failure and the nonidentity this creates.
Thus, it appears that guilt stems from an awareness of
violating that which is to be a normal part of one's known
identity. It is the height of awareness of s e 1 f -al i enat i on
in that its affliction is derived from the culprit's own
sel f -awareness of sel f - v i o 1 at i on .
It is difficult to see how Pannenberg manages this
interpretation of guilt (as se 1 f - v i o 1 at i on ) with the Socratic
premise of formal freedom, and his eschatalogi cal notion of
real freedom. It seems that in each mode of freedom, a
person is still determined toward which action to commit,
since the action will be predicated on an apparent good or a
heightened sense of authentic self-determination. To this
Pannenberg answers that guilt consciousness is not based "on
the consciousness of being the author of an act, but on the
readiness to answer for its consequences . "s s With a full
acceptance of the consequences comes an identification of
self with the act, and thus a responsibility for its
occurrence. "He does not simply accept it willy-nilly but
takes it upon himself and in this way becomes to and for
himself the author of his act."56
54 Pannenberg, Anthro . . 292.
55 Pannenberg, Anthro . . 292.
56 Pannenberg, Anthro . . 292.
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Paul Ricoeur's view on this matter concurs with
Pannenberg's and provides some illumination into the
substance behind Pannenberg's thought. Ricoeur writes:
No doubt we can say that this guilt is already
responsibility, if we mean that being responsible is
being capable of answering for the consequences of an
act; but this consciousness of responsibility is only an
appendage of the consciousness of being charged with the
weight of punishment in anticipation; it does not
proceed from the consciousness of being the author of...
The sociology of responsibility is very illuminating at
this point; man had the consciousness of responsibility
before having the consciousness of being
cause, agent, author. 57
Having examined Pannenberg's thought, it is now in order
to turn Rahner's thought on alienation as it regards sin and
gui 1 t .
In order to comprehend what Rahner says on sin and
guilt, it is necessary to understand his doctrine of freedom.
This is for the reason of connecting guilt for wrong actions
with regard to justifiable culpability; or, the degree of
responsibility for the action coimnitted. To this issue, it
will be found that Rahner construes the notion of freedom
quite differently from Pannenberg. In doing so, he appears
to provide a system which allows for more authentic self-
det erminat i on .
To start off, Rahner is in agreement with Pannenberg on
what freedom is not. Rahner disavows the notion that freedom
is one faculty among others in the human constitution which
57 Ricoeur, 102.
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allows the subject to stand apart from alternatives and
neutrally make arbitrary choices. 58 This is an approach
Rahner views to be too simplistic and pseudo-empirical .
Rahner's understanding of freedom could be labelled as
anthropologically wholistic and not one which is given over
to segmenting a particular faculty of the human subject, i.e.
the f r ee-wi 1 1 .
Freedom, argues Rahner, relates to the single whole of
human existence. It is not something found behind "physical,
biological, exterior and historical temporality of the
subject. "59 Rather, freedom is the actualization of the
whole human subject. Freedom allows the self to be self in
the subjectivity of its identity. This freedom is not a
datum of any identifiably observable or empirical experience.
The unity of freedom in the expression of the whole person
"is antecedent to the individual acts and events of human
life as the condition of their poss i bi 1 i ty . . . "e o it cannot
be categorized since it is the a priori premise from which
all categorization is possible.
Rahner states that the experience and knowledge of
freedom are derived from a person's transcendental experience
of self. Human beings are transcendent beings.
58 Rahner, 94.
59 Rahner, 94.
60 Rahner, 95.
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In spite of the finiteness of his system man is always
present to himself in his entirety. He can place
everything in question. In his openness to everything
and anything, whatever can come to expression can be at
least a question for him. In the fact that he affirms
the possibility of a merely finite horizon. In the fact
that he experiences his finiteness radically, he reaches
beyond this finiteness and experiences himself as a
transcendent being, as spirit. 6i
In the same way, freedom and responsibility are known as
particularities of one's subjectivity in transcendental
experience. Yet, this transcendental experience is not like
one experience among other experiences. Rahner states that
this freedom cannot be objectively represented in and of
itself as other objects can be. It can only be spoken of by
use of an abstract concept of it. 62
Another distinguishing point on Rahner's doctrine of
freedom is its teleological character. Often freedom is
thought of for the purpose of letting one achieve some
uninterrupted, consecutive chain of events. Rahner sees the
teleological character of freedom as being much greater than
what was just described. Freedom has a necessity about it.
This necessity, however, is not like the necessity of
physical events with recurring and unalterable chains of
causation. Freedom is the capacity for subjectivity that
cannot be derived nor explained from such a sequence. ss
61 Rahner, 32.
62 Rahner, 20.
63 Rahner, 95.
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Rahner elaborates in this fashion:
Freedom therefore is not the capacity to do something
which is always able to be revised, but the capacity to
do something final and definitive. It is the capacity
of a subject who by this freedom is to achieve his final
and irrevocable self. 64
Freedom is not like the occurrence of other events which
"goes on generating itself, and becoming something else and
being reduced to something else in its antecedents and
consequences . "6 5 Freedom seeks for the development and final
actualization of the self. This final actualization, Rahner
states, will not take place until eternity. Yet this
temporal life is geared toward actualization in eternity.
"[I]n our passage through the multiplicity of the temporal we
are performing this event of freedom, we are forming the
eternity which we ourselves are becoming. "66
To form the eternity "which we ourselves are becoming"
implies that the transcendental quality which human beings
possess is geared toward a transcendental future. This
aspect of Rahner's thought will be developed further on. It
suffices now, in order to set the base of understanding sin
and guilt, to realize that Rahner's transcendental ontology
is oriented toward a transcendental teleology. So with this
summarization of Rahner's doctrine of sin and freedom, the
64 Rahner, 96.
65 Rahner, 96.
66 Rahner, 96.
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paper can now turn to understand his ideas of sin and guilt.
Rahner states that the subjects of sin and guilt are
crucial matters for Christianity, since it is a religion a
salvation. Yet they are issues that modern humanity is
affectively bothered by in real tangibl e or immediate ways. 67
Part of the reason for this, Rahner explains, is that "modern
social sciences have a thousand ways and means to unmask'
the experience of man's guilt before God and to demolish it
as a false taboo. "68 What was once thought to be a real
morality is now thought of as social norms. This
sociological conception has done much to diminish the idea
and thus the affective reality of guilt.
Rahner argues, however, that much of this conception is
false. Each person, in whatever realm of existence is
ultimately responsible and morally accountable to some
ultimate standards, whether thematically realized or not.
Even the person who fights against all moral conflicts and
experiences "as something which only plunges people into
neurotic anxiety would do that once again with the ardor of
something which he mus t do. "69 The fact of the matter is
that humans are moral beings by transcendental necessity. to
67 Rahner, 91.
68 Rahner, 91.
69 Rahner, 91.
70 Rahner, 92.
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This sense of morality has everything to do with the
transcendental giveness of human freedom. For this freedom
is not of a neutral quality which allows persons to make
either/or choices, but choices that have definitive and
lasting consequence. This kind of teleological and
developmental emphasis can take no other than a moral quality
given the weight of its importance. Yet, granting that
Rahner's description of freedom and its moral quality is real
to experience, the question can be raised as to where the
source of this giveness of experience stems?
Rahner's answer to this question is that idea which
people call God. God is the source of what Rahner refers to
as the horizon of absolute t r anscendent al i ty . t i This horizon
is what allows human subjects to be free. "For wherever
there is no such infinite horizon, such an existent is locked
up within itself in a definite and intrinsic limitation.
without knowing this explicitly itself, and for this reason
it is not free either. "72 For without an infinity for human
subjects to be posited on, there could be no transcendence
since the finite cannot move beyond itself in any way by
standing on its own terms. Thus the source and ground of
humanity's transcendental subjectivity is the infinite being,
God.
71 Rahner, 98.
72 Rahner, 98.
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Now the source of humanity's freedom in
t ranscendental i ty is not conceptually or thematically
realized by most. God as the source of freedom often g-oes
unrecognized, and in fact, on several occasions is explicitly
denied. Rahner argues, however, that an unthematic and non-
conceptual knowledge of God is always present for all
persons, whether or not this is reflected upon, or even
wrongly reflected upon. 7 3 As such, since God is known and
experienced in t r ans cendent al i t y , each person has
responsibility to Him as the source, ground, and final
destiny of their freedom.
How does this responsibility occur? This occurs as a
freedom mediated through the concrete and objective
experiences which encounters the human subject in the
world. 74 Within the varying events which confront the human
subject in the world, each person may or may not choose to
continue to act in congruence with the ground of their being.
They may act authentically within the freedom of their
transcendental subjectivity, or close themselves away within
the smallness of their own finitude. In every confrontation
in the concrete world there is given the opportunity for an
unthemat i c yes or no to God, who gives people their freedom
to walk in.TS
73 Rahner, 98.
74 Rahner, 98.
75 Rahner, 98-99.
29
Rahner, here, elaborates:
Subjectivity and freedom imply and entail that this
freedom with respect to the object of categorical
experience within the absolute horizon of God, but it is
also and in truth, although always in only a mediated
way, a freedom which decides about God and with respect
to God himself. In this sense we encounter God in a
radical way everywhere as a question to our freedom, we
encounter him unexpressed, unthematic, unob j ec t i f i ed and
unspoken in all of the things of the world, and
therefore and especially in our neighbor. t6
A crucial problem with making a decision against freedom
is not only is it a denial against God, but also of one's
self. In that a person's being and identity is grounded in
the transcendental horizon of freedom, so is fulfillment of
that being and identity. When confronted with the concrete
reality of the world, a person who is closed to freedom goes
against the ground of his own character, and thus
participates in an act of sel f -negat ion . This in turn leaves
the agent in a state of unauthent ici ty - For when a person
says no to God, who is the source of his being, he cannot but
help do so also to himself.
Though there is some clarity and coherence in
understanding how sin and self -al ienat ion occur in Rahner's
scheme of thought, it is not so clear, however, as how one
incurs personal guilt. The reason for this is because sin
transpires in the realm of transcendental subjectivity. In
that it transpires in this realm it is not clearly open to
76 Rahner, 101.
77 Rahner, 108.
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ob j ect i f i cat i on , analysis, and judgement. As Rahner states
that human freedom has an a priori immediacy which is unable
to be subjected to a posteriori analysis. So it is with a
violation of this very same freedom in sin. This problem is
made even more complex in that the derivative of the moral
quality of human freedom occurs on an unthematic and non-
conceptual level often times.
Rahner is aware of all of this and writes that "outside
of the possibility of an absolute experience of one's own
subjective evil objectifying itself in the world, [judgement]
can really only claim to be probable at most."T8 Here he
explains that one can know the guilt of his own personal
guilt, but never be for sure of that about others. This is a
realm that is fully personal and not capable of being made
aware of to others.
Rahner does say that people know for sure that this is a
world which is co-determined by guilt. Yet to be able to
pin-point what sector or place the evil of humanity comes
from is something that cannot be done with certainty.
Speaking of the consequences of an evil decision, Rahner
gives this explanation:
They only participate in it, and therefore they are
inevitably characterized by ambiguity. For while
history is still going on, it always remains obscure
whether they really are historical, corporeal
ob j ec t i f i cat i on of a definite good or evil free
decision, or whether it only looks this way because this
78 Rahner, 108.
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ob j ec t i f i cat i on has arisen only out of pre-personal
necess i t i es . t 9
When Rahner speaks of pre-personal necessities, he is
referring to that process where o ver -aggr es s i on is simply
developmental ly natural in the process of personalization.
In another place he describes it this way:
We could assume that unfortunate situations which are
detrimental to freedom and which always have to be
worked through in the development of the human race
never arise out of a really subjectively evil decision,
but that they are the early stages of a development
which begins from far below and moves upwards, and is
not yet finished. so
Rahner, however, is explicit about the point that each
honest person has a subjective awareness as to the reality of
personal guilt. Not only this, the ob j ect i f i cat i ons of
personal guilt in the world do make themselves felt and
known, no matter how ambiguously. In fact, it is within the
historical ambiguity of evil that co-determines and shapes
each person's freedom in subjectivity. For every decision is
made in a concrete historical setting where the effects of
guilt objectify themselves. Due to this a good act itself
remains ambiguous. "It always remains burdened with
consequences which could not really be intended because they
lead to tragic impasses, and which disguise the good that was
intended by one's own freedom." 8i
79 Rahner, 107.
80 Rahner, 108.
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In light of this, Rahner states that "man [is] a being
threatened radically by guilt. "82 it is the threat of
personal guilt and the guilt of others that should drive
people to soberness and caution in estimating the positive
possibilities of humankind. Rahner's own conclusion is that
"there is for the human race in its concrete history no real
possibility of ever overcoming once and for all this
determination of the situation of freedom by guilt. "83
It is in this perspective, with a somewhat historical
pessimism, that Rahner believes Christianity and thus
theology should portray the reality of sin.
Now having given a summary observation of Rahner, this
paper can proceed contrast and critically evaluate Pannenberg
and Rahner respectively. This evaluation will not be done
solely to assess the ultimate truth value of each position.
Rather, it will be done to set some of the necessary moorings
for further observation and analysis to be gleaned later on
in this thesis. With this in mind, the paper shall examine
in successive order their doctrines of freedom, sin, and then
gui 1 1 .
Pannenberg and Rahner agree and differ considerably on
the issue of freedom. They agree in that they see freedom as
the starting point and basis from which moral responsibility
82 Rahner, 109.
83 Rahner, 109.
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and personal identity are to be derived. Freedom is
concerned with self-determination. Self-determination is
concerned with fulfilling one's identity in action. The
fulfillment of personhood is a critical issue in the minds of
both theologians. This is largely for the reason because
they see God as the ground and source of every human's
personhood. So the fulfillment of personhood as it is
grounded in God and guided in freedom of self-expression is
of essential importance. Any sort of anthropological
coercion would be the demise of personal meaning.
The difference lies in how each theologian construes
human self-determination. Pannenberg takes a soft or semi-
deterministic view of the will, while Rahner adheres to more
of a libertarian view. With Pannenberg's Socratic conception
of the will, the human subject always does what is perceived
to be for his own good at the moment of choice. This is at
least in the realm of formal freedom. At the level of real
freedom the subject does what is actually best with the
realization of responsibility in identity with one's own
personal destiny. Rahner, however, believes that the
immediate power of self-determination is always and
transcendental ly present with the agent, giving that on the
ability to exercise a yes or no toward the authentic movement
of freedom.
To this it may be said that Rahner appears to assign a
level of authentic spiritual realization (given the
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unthematic experience) on a general level of human experience
which Christianity has traditionally not found warranted.
Though both theologians realize that God is the basis of all
of humanity's freedom and destiny, Pannenberg appears still
to draw a clearer distinction between God's immanence in
natural grace, and God's special revelation of Himself in
transcendence. Pannenberg's conception of the will appears
to be in sounder theological territory, along with the likes
of Kierkegaard and Augustine.
With regard to the area of sin, the theologians, though
embarking on similar goals, appear nonetheless to take
different paths. Sin for Rahner is failure to make an
authentic decision when confronted by the concreteness of
worldly reality. It is diverting from the subjectivity of
one's freedom in making a decision of final and lasting
consequence, to a decision that is abortive toward the
individual's integral character. Pannenberg, though keeping
with the emphasis on se 1 f -authent i cat i on , construes it more
in terms of an exocentric destiny beyond the individual
subject. To sin, in this case, is to avoid one's destiny
with the closing in on the self in egocent r i c i ty .
Though both theological stances have valid points to
make, Pannenberg appears to have hit the target in defining
sin more accurately. This is disobedience or denial of God's
will for one's life. Rahner, likewise, can be construed as
saying the same thing, but in a different way. This,
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however, cannot be easily done. For Rahner does not give
much outward objectivity to the will of God in distinction
from the will of the human subject. Instead, the will of God
for Rahner is to act finally and decisively in authentication
of human development. Pannenberg, on the other hand, sees
the subject needing to be oriented toward an eschatalogi cal
otherness . This is important in the Christian message for
distinguishing the otherness of God, which relates to His
will, in distinction from that of human beings.
On the subject of guilt, it seems that both theologians
have a healthy recognition of its fact and consequence. Both
understand it as an offense to God and a weight of corrective
for the sins of humanity. On this point, any distinctions
between Rahner and Pannenberg have little if any bearing for
the purposes of this thesis. With that observation, then,
this writer will forego any more comment on their
understanding of guilt. It will, however, be an issue of
great importance later on in the paper-
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CHAPTER 2
It has been seen that Pannenberg and Rahner have well
thought out doctrines on the issues of sin and guilt. The
question which this chapter will seek to address is how the
sel f -t ranscendent subject comes to understand the objectivity
of personal sin and guilt. The previous chapter discused
conceptions of violating one's s e 1 f - t r ans cendence , this
chapter aims at discovering how the s e 1 f- t r ans cendent subject
comes to a knowledge of this violation. Niebuhr asks a
similar question near the beginning of his Nature and Destiny
of Man. "How can man be essentially evil if he knows himself
to be so? What is the character of the ultimate subject, the
quintessential X� which passes such devastating judgements
upon itself as object?"i
This same probing question must be extracted from the
theologies of Pannenberg and Rahner. In order to see the
depth of their understanding of the depravity of human
nature, one must assess their understanding of the self-
transcendent subject's knowledge and awareness of his
personal state. Buber, in a similar fashion to Niebuhr,
states that the ego or the quintessential l_ is able to stand
outside of the self and cast judgement on it.
Consciousness of the !_ is not connected with the
primitive of the instinct for self-preservation any more
than with that of the other instincts. It is not the X
1 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, 2
vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), 1.
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that wishes to propagate itself, but the body, that
knows of yet of no 1.2
As seen within the s e 1 f - t r ans cendent consciousness of
human nature, there is a dual reference point of human
consciousness: the ego and the self. As Buber seems to have
stated rightly, the ego has the capability to stand in
differentiation form the self or the body. Such a
constitutional organization of the psyche allows the
possibility for humans to engage in critical se 1 f -r ef 1 ec t i on .
The point now to be derived is what allowance does Rahner and
Pannenberg make for the awareness of sin through critical
sel f -ref 1 ect ion? or how much can the ego be distant from the
self to honestly engage the depth of its sinfulness?
This paper shall seek first to understand Pannenberg on
this issue, and then Rahner.
Pannenberg clearly stresses in his anthropology the
point that humanity has an exocentric orientation.
Pannenberg quotes Max Scheler with the observation that
exocent r i c i ty is the most general quality among humans and to
that extent is the most "fundamental characteristic of [that
which is] properly human. "� Animals, too, are exocentric.
In fact, they are more in tune with their environment than
2 Martin Buber, I and Thou. 2nd ed. , trans, by Ronald
G. Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 21.
3 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological
Per spect i ve , trans. Matthew J. O' Connel (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1985), 63.
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are humans. Yet human exocent r i c i ty is distinct from that of
the animals. Katz has pointed out in Animals and Men that
animals live totally present in their environment, unaware of
a real past or future.* Humans, however, in their
exocentr i ci ty are able to purposely distance themselves from
their imposed environment. In this way humans are not
absorbed into their impressions, but can experience "what is
other as. other. "s
In that the human subject is capable of doing this, a
level of self-transcendence is achieved. To experience that
which is other as other is a capability only given to humans.
To experience imposing phenomena as differentiated and
uniquely distinct from self is to be able to rise above the
pure objectivity of the material environment. It is to be
subject in relation to all other imposing objectivity. This
is an aspect of self-transcendent perception. As such, it
places the exocentric quality of human relatability at a
qualitative distinction from other animals.
In a person's s e 1 f -di s t anc i at i on from all other objects,
there is also the power of free selectivity to be present to
whi ch-so-ever object the subject may choose. "This structure
of behavior which allows human beings to direct themselves to
the object as other also makes it possible for them to
4 Pannenberg, 61.
5 Pannenberg, 62.
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distance themselves from it in favor of still another.
Thus the subjective knower not only transcends in the act of
perception, but also the reality of perception itself.
Therefore, in the act of experience there is a fundamental
interchange between perceived reality and the ego.T
This interchange allows the knowing subject to take
phenomenal reality and compare it to other as other and to
the self. This is a higher order of knowing which allows the
human subject to embrace a generality of understanding.
This, of course, exceeds the knowledge gained of objects in
their momentary indi v idual i ty . � It moves one into the realm
of universals. So the exocentric orientation of humanity
structurally reveals to the subject a high degree of self-
knowledge. The knower has the capability of comparing and
contrasting his ego to self and to his environmental reality.
Pannenberg argues, as does Rahner, that this exocentric
orientation implicitly has a religious dimension to it. For
with the higher order of knowledge and its entrance into the
realm of universals, it can easily be inferred that this
knowledge does not have its grounding in individual
particularity. It must be grounded in some higher order of
being. Pannenberg, working from the thought of Plessner,
6 Pannenberg, 67.
7 Pannenberg, 67.
8 Pannenberg, 68.
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states it in this fashion:
I... transcend every finite content in the very act of
grasping it. The experience need not mean that I
abandon the finite objects: rather, I become conscious
that these objects do not have their root in themselves.
Thus the experience of transcending all finite contents
leads "to the consciousness of unqualified contingency
of existence and thus to the idea of a ground of the
world... or to God. 9
Whether this reality is grasped in these conceptual terms or
not, Pannenberg writes that it is a "reality prior to them;
the divine reality, even though they have not yet grasped
this thematically as such, much less in this or that
particular form."io
This elaboration, thus far, may not appear pertinent to
the issue of critical reflection in coming to a self-
awareness of one's sin. Yet Pannenberg first wants to
establish that humans have the capacity for a real knowledge
of reality. This knowledge is not superficial, but is
intricately interchanged with the intimate knowledge of self.
Not only this, but in the act of knowing, divine reality is
implicitly embraced. As such, the human subject would appear
also to be natively oriented to sooner or later realize, or
at least grapple with fundamental issues, i.e., the r ight s of
reality and the guilt which occurs through transgressing
those r ights .
With Pannenberg's account of human exocent r i c i ty , it
9 Pannenberg, 69.
10 Pannenberg, 69.
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would certainly appear that the capability for consciously
grasping one's personal sin is possible. Pannenberg,
however, realizes that the answer to this issue is not that
easily answered. For the question was originally formulated
earlier in this chapter if whether or not the ego can stand
sufficiently apart from the self to provide an honest
evaluation of one's sinfulness. Pannenberg's basic account
of human exocent r i c i ty lends credence to the idea that the
ego can relate in honesty to the self.
Yet there is another issue to be raised. Though
granting that the exocentric orientation of understanding is
sufficiently in tune for all people: is, however, the
interpretation of the perceived reality always correct? or,
in other words, is the sel f -understanding of the ego in
relation with the self sufficiently oriented, for all, to
correctly understand the exocentric data as it stands and is
interpreted in relation to the subjective knower? If the
interpreter does not interpret correctly, especially as it
relates to morality and sin, then the exocentric orientation
of knowledge is of little avail in bringing one to understand
explicitly one's sinfulness. To glean what Pannenberg states
on this issue, the paper now turns.
In short, the answer to the question raised is that
there is no guarantee in Pannenberg's anthropological
understanding that a person will be able to come to a
knowledge of sinfulness through critical sel f -r ef 1 ect i on .
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This is an issue which revolves around the honesty of the
relation of the self and the ego. For Pannenberg, in keeping
with the ever openness of human nature, develops an
anthropology of what could be called the openness of the self
and the ego. Though granting a reality of the ego in
distinction from the self, he does not see these as having
fixed sel f -conceptual congruities in identity and moral
format i on .
Two classical views which stand in contrast to
Pannenberg's are those of Fichte and Hume. Fichte believed
that the ego and the self receive their unity in self-
consciousness. For Fichte, se 1 f-consc i ousness is a
fundamental and absolute given of all reality. Self-
consciousness is a manifestation of God and a knowledge of it
cannot be derived at from any other basis than itself. ii Yet
this sel f -consciousness allows the power of the ego to
identify with itself. In this identification, the ego
positions itself on the ground of self-consciousness to be
able to form and critically discover the identity of the
self.
Thus in Fichte' s scheme, the ego is able to achieve a
high degree of independence for honest se 1 f -cr i t i cal
reflection. Fichte illustrates what is meant here:
I shall open my eyes, shall learn thoroughly to know
myself, shall recognize that constraint... I shall thus-
11 Pannenberg, 203.
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and, under that supposition, I shall necessar i ly-f orm my
own mode of thought. I shall stand absolutely
independent, thoroughly equipped and perfected through
my own act and deed. The primitive source of all my
other thought and of my life itself, that from which
everything proceeds that can have existence in me, for
me, or through me, the innermost spirit of my spirit, is
no longer a foreign power, but it is, in the strictest
possible sense, the product of my own will. 12
For any spirit of grandiosity that may come from Fichte's
words, his statements illustrate a view of the great power
and independence of the ego. Pannenberg states that
contemporary psychology largely holds to the model of the ego
as exemplified by Fichte. i3
Another spectrum of thought opposed to both Fichte and
Pannenberg is that of Hume. Hume has a very empirically
based concept of the ego. Hume relates ego identification
"so closely to individual conscious experiences that the
uni ty of the ego through time becomes secondary or even a
pure product of the imaginat ion. "1 * Hume noticed that when a
person turns in reflection to self there is nothing there to
be perceived except what is already perceived through
perceptions from past experience: various ideas already
empirically learned. "The ego is primarily given with the
experiences of the moment. "i* Thus Hume writes in his A
12 Johann G. Fichte, "The Vocation of Man," The
European Philosophers From Descartes to Nietzsche, ed. Monroe
C. Beardsley (New York: The Modern Library, 1992), 496-97.
13 Pannenberg, 201.
14 Pannenberg, 216.
15 Pannenberg, 216.
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Treatise Concerning Human Nature that the ego is "nothing but
a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which
succeed each other with an incredible rapidity, and are in
perpetual flux and movement"! 6
To these two classical positions, Pannenberg has some
commonality, but also some substantial differences.
Pannenberg, in his position, starts of by asserting that the
identity of the ego is primarily tied as a mirror reflection
to the consciousness of the self. Pannenberg notes that in a
baby's initial stages of development, the self of the child
does not distinguish himself from the self of the mother. it
This is a distinction that comes through the acquisition of
speech and object perception. As these are developed, the
indexical reference point, the X, of the self comes into
format i on . i 8
Yet as the I_ formulates with the development of object
perception and speech, it takes on what Pannenberg states is
an unthematic character. There grows in a child an awareness
of self, but the awareness is of a primary nature, and is not
introspect ively expanded. i9 So the primary awareness in the
16 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A.
Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1888), book 1, part 4,
sec . 6 .
17 Pannenberg, 22.
18 The "indexical reference point" is that part of the
self against which all thngs are checked.
19 Pannenberg, 222.
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development of identity is the formation of the self before
the ego. It is later, after the formation of self, that the
ego supervenes on the self with the realization that it is
part of the self's identity. It is with this supervening
that the process of critical sel f -ref 1 ect ion begins.
Yet Pannenberg is clear to explain that the ego only has
its continuity of identification with the already formed and
ever-present self. The ego must find its position of
identity on the self. It does not posit its own self in
sel f -consciousness , or derive its being solely from a cluster
of experiences. The ego is formulated constitutionally from
the self in all its "states, qualities, and actions. "20 Yet
the ego is independent in several ways to the self, as in
Buber ' s formulation.
Pannenberg elaborates:
When the individual ego knows itself, it can know that
this identity is based on its self or exercise it as
ego. It can distance itself from its bodily, its
"social,' and even its "spiritual' self and in the
course of its identity formation project ever new forms
of the self. But it can also for the sake of its self,
distance itself from its own ego... Finally, it can
allow the ego to be determined by the self so that the
ego gains the stability and the continuity that enable
it to master the impulses of the id. 21
Thus it is seen that in Pannenberg's concptuality of the ego
there is understood to be a certain degree of autonomy. This
autonomy allows it, in part, to shape the self's formation.
20 Pannenberg, 221.
21 Pannenberg, 222.
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The formative process of the ego upon the self, however, is
proceeded by the self's formation. "The cohesion and unity
of the individual's life history are based on the self, not
on the ego ."22
At this point there has been seen much discussion on the
formation of the self's identity upon which the ego projects
itself. There has not, however, been any word stated on how
the self forms its identity. On this point, all that is
really needed to be said is that the self's identity is
determined in large by the experiences gained from its
surrounding social structure. The self, Pannenberg states,
is not completely determined by its existing social
structure. The ego does not have to accept the social self.
It can to one degree or another disregard the "classification
and expectations assigned to it by others. "23
No one, though, can break totally free of their social
self. The ego can only posit itself from the self. This
self, which has in large been formed by society, is the only
basis from which the ego stands to form both identification
and sel f- judgement . Thus the individual subject within a
society only has a limited degree of sel f -autonomy .
Pannenberg writes that "the acquisition of an acceptable
measure of social recognition is indispensable as the basis
22 Pannenberg, 223.
23 Pannenberg, 223.
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of all life in soc i e t y . . .
" 2 4
This leads again to make the reiteration that the
exocentric structure of human knowledge is not full-proof in
leading the knower to interpret reality as it really is. The
exocentric structure of knowledge is not guided along hard
and fast lines of behavioral dispositions. One's social
identity and the sel f -acceptance of that identity has several
ramifications on the knower ' s perception of reality. 25 As
such, the question of coming honestly to a knowledge of one's
sinfulness, through critical s e 1 f -r ef 1 ec t i on , is an open
question. There are no given referential points of knowledge
where such an understanding may be attained, especially
granting the relativity of assigned social roles in identity
f ormat ion.
More will have to be stated about Pannenberg's position
on this matter later. Having, however, drawn a sufficient
amount of information from Pannenberg, it is now time to turn
to Rahner's thought on the very same issue.
Rahner's anthropology is more accepting of the idea of a
knowledge of sinfulness gained through critical self-
reflection. A sinful act according to Rahner, one which
incurs guilt, can only be knowingly committed. 26 if it can
24 Pannenberg, 224.
25 Pannenberg, 72.
26 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 2, tr.
Karl-H. Kruger (1963; rpt., Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1964),
267 .
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be knowingly committed then it can be obviously re-perceived
through critical s e 1 f -r ef 1 ec t i on . Rahner states that there
can be "extremely r ef 1 ect ionl ess , forgotten, dissimulating or
suppressed guilt, but not guilt brought about unknowingly and
involuntar i ly . "2 7 Rahner reasons that there are different
degrees of guilt according to a person's knowledge and
freedom, but there are no unknown sins.
Though Rahner's anthropology allows for a good deal of
possibility in the discovery of one's sinfulness, there is
still much ambiguity to this issue in relation to his
theology. Rahner states that if a person commits guilty sin,
it is done knowingly. In fact, in the act of transgression,
there is self-determined reflection in the process. Yet in
this reflection there is a certain vagueness regarding the
sin being committed. It is clear that when one reflects in
the midst of a sinful action that this person "always
encounters himself in his reflection as someone who has
already decided, i.e. as someone in a determined moral
disposition", and never as one who makes a decision out of
moral indi f f er ence . 2 �
With this reflection, however, the agent is unable with
any certitude to trace the origin from which the action
proceeds, whether it consists in the act itself or in a state
27 Rahner, 267.
28 Rahner, 268.
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of sinfulness.
Guilt, in spite of its basically active character and
its nature as an event, has a diffuse existence for us
in the whole course of human history, even simply on
account of the fact that ultimately our subsequent and
always unfinished reflection and "analysis' can never
resolve the conjunction of act and state, habitual
disposition and new original decision, sin and
s inf ulness . 2 9
Since the world and its history in which humanity lives is so
deeply characterized by the effects of sin, it is extremely
difficult to discover that act which was originally produced
or that one which stems from ill effects which has not "been
stored up in a person's historical memory and thus be always
available for renewed r ef 1 ec t i on . " 3 0
Another difficulty which stems from the possibility of
reflecting on sin is the ability to be able to attain
objective knowledge through one's subjective judgement, which
is itself subject to judgement. Rahner explains:
Reflection can never "catch up' with man for the simple
reason that every reflection, whatever its pretensions
to objectivity, is itself a morally good or evil act
demanding a new reflection on its own quality and so on
ad infinitum. 3 1
So the idea of a pure i nt e 1 1 ec t ual i s t i c reflection in coming
to terms with one's sinfulness is out of the question for
Rahner. There has to be another way which is more
constitutive or in accordance with human transcendental
29 Rahner, 268.
30 Rahner, 269.
31 Rahner, 276.
nature .
Rahner, of course, acknowledges this. Humanity, he
states, to know themselves must go beyond themselves. Self
consciousness is only attained by being conscious of
something other than self. The person who catches sight of
self only does so through perceiving another object. "Man
always requires some material distinct from himself which
will act as an Archimedian point, so to speak, from which
alone he can attain himself. "32 This is due to humanity's
transcendental orientation, or what Pannenberg calls
exocent r i c i ty .
So with this given structural orientation of knowledge
pure introspection in subjectivity is a fruitless endeavor
for self-knowledge. To attain the knowledge of one's
sinfulness, it must be gained through a mediating form
outside of the self. Rahner sees that humans need a s ign
which points to one's objective guilt. 33 This s ign is not
be confused with the guilt itself, but rather serves as a
constitutive pointer to the fact of guilt.
This constitutive sign is in reference to an
objectively tangible offence against man's nature,
against his due relationship to God which can be
formulated as a law, and against the int r amundane ,
ordered structure of persons and things in his
surroundings, is the constitutive s ign of the real
revolt against God taking place in the depth of man's
32 Rahner, 269.
33 Rahner, 270.
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soul and utterly determining' it. We call this objective
falseness of man's concrete act a sign'. 34
Now as a sign, it will always point to the fact of
guilt. Yet it will not always point directly to personal
guilt. For the realized objective falseness, whether
internal or external, may be induced by external factors
which were not brought out by personally culpable factors. 3s
Rahner gives the example of drunkenness. Drunkenness is
normally wrong because it offends against the health of a
person both physically and spiritually. Yet Rahner states
that there are some cases which are not culpable because the
person may not have known about the harm from drunkenness, or
was externally forced to get drunk. 36 in both cases the
person has neither the knowledge or the will to resist the
harmful effects which drunkenness brings. This person cannot
be considered culpable.
There are other cases in which drunkenness is brought
about willingly and knowingly. These are the ones where the
"concrete material or the sign-like manifestation of personal
guilt, by and within which the personal turning-away from God
realizes itself in concrete ."3 7 So with a combined effect of
one's a priori conditioned knowledge in freedom and the
34 Rahner, 270.
35 Rahner, 270.
36 Rahner, 270-71.
37 Rahner, 271.
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constitutive sign bring-ing a concrete correlation to one's
inner state, knowledg'e of one's sinfulness is possible.
Rahner admits, however, that this knowledge is really
not that clear, and that its purposes are only provisional.
Rahner states that the Scriptures are clear that no person
can make absolute judgement about another person concerning
his state before God. In the same way, a person is not
allowed to pass absolute s e 1 f - j udgement declaring for himself
either that a "justifying or sinful act has certainly taken
place here and now. "3 8 Though the constitutive sign of a
human action is of an informative nature, the information
that it gives is of an egui vocal character.
This equivocal character of the sign is for the reason
that it is imbedded in that intermediary reality which is
outside of a person that is often times riddled with
ambiguities of int erpr e t at i on . 3 9 Due to the ambiguity of the
intermediate sign, one cannot be allowed to make an absolute
judgement, but only a judgement that is provisional.
Absolute judgement regarding one's sinfulness can only be
reserved to God.
By "not being absolutely clear to oneself', of "not
being able to deal definitively with oneself', this
interpretation not only realizes a regrettable fact but
also a basic and essential situation of the creature,
since it is precisely at this point that the creature
surrenders himself unconditionally to God.io
38 Rahner, 276.
39 Rahner, 276.
40 Rahner, 276.
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Thoug-h a provisional awareness of one's sinfulness is
all that is allowed to the human knower, it is, at least, a
possibility which one must exercise, i.e. a serious
consideration of one's sinful condition. The problem with
humanity is not so much the problem of coming to an awareness
of individual acts of sin, it is, rather, coming to terms
with whether or not one is dealing with the fact of his
openness to transcendent reality. Is one's whole being
geared to what is true through all of life? Is one taking
serious the reality of living in openness with the character
of transcendent being?
These would appear to be for Rahner the questions which
one can and must engage through critical self-reflection.
This is the very issue that people living in inauthent i ci ty
would like to avoid. The reality of living authentically in
self-transcendence is easily avoided. Yet if it is, one is
living in disobedience to the call and will of God to aspire
toward authenticity.
Rahner provides three reasons why the experience of
transcendence is evaded. The first is the reason of naivete.
Those who evade their transcendence for this reason do so
because it simply does not make sense to get caught up in it.
These people live in a concrete world at a distance from
themselves, where reality can be controlled and
manipulated. 4 1 In this concrete world, there is plenty to
41 Karl Rahner, Foundations of christian Faith, tr.
William V. Dych (New York: Cross Road, 1978), 32.
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do. It is also very interesting and important to them.
The second reason is due to agnosticism. Those who
embrace this as a reason for evading the issue of
transcendence believe "that everything is encompassed in an
ultimate question. '42 To categorically sort through the
ultimate questions of life is an impossibility. The best one
can do is maintain a healthy scepticism. The third reason is
because of nihilism. These are the people who go about their
normal business to live the best that they can. However, in
the final realization, after attaining all that is thought
possible to be attained, they come to a point of despair and
admit that the whole makes no sense. Instead of accepting
the authenticity that is theirs, they simply state "that one
does well to suppress the question about the meaning of it
all and to reject it as an unanswerable and hence a
meaningless question. "4 3
In response to these points, Rahner provides some lucid
observations. When it comes to confronting and interpreting
reality, one cannot easily make the judgements like the three
given above. In regard to the naive interpretation of
existence, Rahner states that humans are dependent beings.
They are in large conditioned by their history and very
dependent on the reality about them. 44 it is really
42 Rahner, Foundat i ons . 32.
43 Rahner, Foundat i ons . 33.
44 Rahner, Foundat i ons . 43.
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unrealistic and dishonest for people to think that they are
their own lords in the immediacy of their own existence, and
that questions about the ultimacy and meaning of existence
are superfluous. This is for the very reason that their
individuality is not the ground and basis of their existence.
Its source and support come from something else, and this is
what needs to be sought and questioned.
To the evasions of agnosticism and nihilism Rahner
charges that these ideologies do not honestly confront the
reality which faces them. When a person faces the
absurdities and evil of existence, there is also within these
experiences hope. This is the experience of hope toward a
liberating freedom. Rahner says that which imposes real
burdens on a person is also a source of blessing. 45 Yet it
is within the very burdens of life and the accompanying
experience of hope that one gets caught within an unescapable
sense of responsibility. In the pain, absurdity, and
confusion of life, one must walk in hope toward liberation.
This is in accordance with the transcendental character of
humanity. To evade this in agnosticism or nihilism is simply
a away to cover from the ultimate reality to which human
nature is called.
Human beings in accordance with their transcendental
nature are called to freedom. This freedom is to live
45 Rahner, Foundat i ons . 33.
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authentically with the true nature of their being. It is
given to people as an a priori possibility. To know the
absoluteness of each person's heart, whether toward good or
bad, is not a possibility because of the ambiguity of human
knowledge. There are, however, provisional factors and
indicators that point people along the way in which they are
to live. Yet these indicators and signs are not to point a
person to the mere immediacy of their subjective reality, but
ultimately to a trust and dependence on God.
Having now looked at some of the high points of Rahner's
thought on critical s e 1 f - r ef 1 ec t i on , the paper can now turn
to evaluate Rahner's thought in comparison with Pannenberg's.
A contrast and comparison will be given, then to be followed
by some critical evaluation.
The first thing will be to note the similarities between
the two theologians. Both hold to a view of the
exocent r i c i ty of human knowledge, and both realize the
ambiguity within that structural apprehension of knowledge.
Rahner and Pannenberg see that humans only know themselves in
relation to that which is outside of themselves. In that
knowing, they transcend beyond that which is merely known.
In their transcendence they move into the realm of finite
relatability in the background of un 1 imi t ednes s . This is
where perception is capable of moving into the realm of
universals. Thus this structure of universality gives the
knowing subject the capability to move into knowledge about
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ul t imate real i ty .
Yet in this openness to knowing universals and ultimate
truths, there is an epistemic hindrance due to an ambiguity
of perception. On this point Pannenberg and Rahner agree.
Yet they appear to come to a disagreement on where the
ambiguity lies within the exocentric structure of knowledge.
For Pannenberg the ambiguity lies within the determinate
structure of the knower. With Rahner it appears to be more
in the ambiguity of the intermediary reality outside of the
human knower. This is a critical point of distinction,
especially as it relates to upcoming discussions with in this
thes i s .
Pannenberg sees that a person's perception of reality
has much to do with personal identity. One perceives what is
beyond in relation to self. Yet one's own sel f -const rual has
an effect on reality as it is perceived. This does not go to
say that the reality perceived does not have an effect on
one's se 1 f -const rual . It certainly does have an effect. Yet
there is a reciprocity of relationship. So in Pannenberg's
scheme of perceptual ambiguity of reality is based on the
determinate character of the subjective knower.
In Rahner the ambiguity has not so much to do with any
reflective problems in the knower, but in a natural
incongruity between the knower and the perceived reality.
The problem is not in the human subject's sel f -percept ion and
identification. It lies rather in the subject's self-
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transcendence in knowledge and the variable structure of the
finite reality which is perceived. There is simply an
ep i s t emo 1 og-i cal incongruity which hampers, as Rahner says,
any pretensions to objectivity. Thus for Rahner, humans have
the need for subjective honesty in priority to outward
clarity.
It is then possible for a person to have the ability to
reflect on his sinfulness in Rahner's scheme of human
knowing. The subjective awareness in transcendental knowing
is always ready at hand. One is more accountable to what is
within rather than something which is without. Authenticity
has to do with being subjectively honest within while
confronted with the ambiguity which comes from with out.
Though the ambiguity from with out gives reflective signs of
knowledge of what is within, the stress still remains with
the priority of the subjective reality.
Pannenberg, on the other hand, sees more the need of
humans to find identification and accountability from that
reality which is other . The ambiguity from within makes this
difficult as far as a pure understanding of self and reality
goes. Therefore, there is not a given referential point on
which one will necessarily be able to understand personal
sinfulness. This is in part why Pannenberg holds to the
Socratic understanding of the will. One does and can merely
do as he sees to be for his own good. This is simply the
relation of perception in movement with personal identity.
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In this writers view Pannenberg's account of the
possibility of human sel f -cr i t i cal reflection is more
accurate than is Rahner's. Pannenberg's seems to be more
fitting' of the case for both a traditional understanding of
spiritual blindness to sin and the nature of reality.
Scripture repeatedly refers to the darkness which humanity is
in about themselves and the nature of reality apart from the
light of Christ. 46
Plus, giving the various and multitude of perspectives
on evil and morality from individual to individual, and from
culture to culture, it appears difficult to construe all
humanity within an a priori structure of sel f -understanding
like Rahner gives. Pannenberg seems correct to position the
ego on the primacy of the self's development and
understanding. One's self-construal is determined in large
from the identity which has been personally given in the
self's surrounding context. Teilhard de Chardin gives
credence to the subtlety of this development when he writes:
"Psychologically, our souls are incredibly subtle and
complex: how can one fit them into a world of laws and
f ormul as * ^
46 Pannenberg writes: "only in the light of a concern
for a universal redmption have the signs of the universality
of sin manifested their comprehensive character. The
doctrine of the universality of sin was not taught until the
advent of Christianity." see: Pannenberg, Anthro . , 119-38.
47 Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, 3rd ed.,
tr. Bernard Wall (New York: Harper & Row, Pub., 1975), 281.
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This finally leads to the question of how one is to
discover the problems and sins which hamper the realization
of life's meaning. Is life's meaning to be discovered with
in the a priori structures of human consciousness? or is
there to be revelation which comes from outside human
consciousness which brings the realization of this meaning?
To these question the following chapters will be devoted.
This will be in regard to Rahner's doctrine of anonymous
Christianity, and Pannenberg's understanding of
Christocentric revelation.
61
CHAPTER 3
The issue to be discussed now is salvation. In order to
discuss Rahner's understanding of salvation, especially as it
relates to anonymous Christianity, it has been necessary to
examine with some depth Rahner's understanding of human
sinfulness. This chapter, then, will seek to focus on
understanding Rahner's doctrine of salvation and its
appropriation in relation to his understanding of human
sinfulness. It will be done so with a view of seeking out
the consistency of its relation to itself, and some possible
objections raised by other theological perspectives.
Earlier chapters of this thesis have looked into some of
the fundamental issues and themes surrounding Rahner's
doctrine of human sinfulness. This was not without
justification. Rahner states himself:
Guilt and sin are without doubt a central topic for
Christianity. For it understands itself as a religion
of redemption, as the event of the forgiveness of guilt
by God himself in his action on us in Jesus Christ, in
his death and resurrection. Christianity understands
man as a being whose free, sinful acts are not his
"private affair' which he himself can absolve by his own
power and strength. Rather, however much man's free
subjectivity is responsible for them, once they are done
they can be really overcome only by God's action. i
So, then, this paper will now turn to the issue of God's
provision for salvation, and the human appropriation of that
salvation, in light of Rahner's understanding.
1 Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, tr.
William V. Dych (New York: Cross Road, 1978), 90.
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Rahner makes clear that the possibility for salvation
from sin comes from God's universal will to save. Any source
from which salvation springs is fundamentally constituted
from this will. Out of God's universal will to salvation
comes Rahner's doctrine of salvation history. Humanity has a
transcendal i ty of openness to the divine. This essence of
openness is actualized in the concreteness of history. This
transcendal i ty of realization takes place by the divinizing
sel f -communi cat ion of God. Rahner says this is a reality
which is not just a part of simple existence. 2
In order to understand Rahner's doctrine of salvation
history, there will need to be some preliminary statements on
Rahner's doctrine of God's sel f -communi cat ion to humanity.
Rahner explains that the term sel f -communi cat ion in the
context for which he uses it refers to the idea that "God in
his own most proper reality makes himself the innermost
constitutive reality of man. "3 This is the ontological self-
communication of God. This ontological knowledge cannot be
construed as a knowledge which can be objectified or reified.
The ontological sel f -coimnuni cat ion of God corresponds to
humanity's essential being. It is in the part of "man whose
being is being-present-to himself, and being personally
2 Rahner, 138.
3 Rahner, 116.
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responsible for himself in s e 1 f -cons c i ousnes s and freedom. "4
This communication occurs in the utmost part of human
t r anscendal i ty . It is not a part of human reality which is
open to ob j ec t i f i ca t i on or themat i zat i on . It is an aspect of
human existence that can be known and realized, but not
grasped. Yet, it is spirit which makes humans as they are as
transcendent beings.
Yet, what is more precisely meant by the idea of God's
sel f -communi cat ion? To answer this Rahner says that it is
necessary to look at human transcendental experience. Humans
are finite beings who have their source and ground of being
in the absolute God. This absolute grounding for finite
humanity is an existential mystery. This is for the reason
that the finite cannot comprehend the absolute, at least
thematically. For that which humanity is grounded in is
other than itself.
So God as the absolute ground of human existence and
source of human transcendence is not able to be grasped in
this mode of relation to human existence. However, in God's
act of se 1 f -communi cat i on , "he offers himself in his own
reality-"5 In s e 1 f -communi cat i on , God offers Himself in
closeness to humanity. He does not offer Himself as a thing
among other things, yet He does not remain aloof in His
transcendence from human comprehension and relatability.
4 Rahner, 117.
5 Rahner, 119.
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Divine s e 1 f -commun i ca t i on means, then, that God can
communicate himself in his own reality to what is not
divine without ceasing- to be infinite reality and
absolute mystery, and without man ceasing to be a finite
existent different from God.e
This knowledge of God cannot be put in a system of human
coordinates, but the godness of God, in this communication,
remains a "holy mystery [and] becomes [a] radical and
insuppr ess ibl e reality for man. "7
Rahner states that the s e 1 f -communi cat i on of God takes
place in the innate constitutive realm of the human subject.
God does not communicate something secondary to Himself, nor
does His communication cause an effect which is different
from the human subject. "It is rather the real essence of
that which constitutes the ontological relationship between
God and creatures. "8 It is, thus, an occurrence which is
natural in the range of human experience, but supernatural in
its quality. God's self-communication is natural in that it
takes place in the innate transcendental framework of human
comprehension. It is supernatural in that it is divine
grace, given to all, which communicates forth God's love.
Because this grace is something other than human
transcendental experience, or it is rather a modality of that
experience, 9 the human subject has the power to turn from it
6 Rahner, 119.
7 Rahner, 120.
8 Rahner, 122.
9 Rahner, 129.
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with his transcendence. It is a grace which is given to all
people, with the exclusion of no one. As such, it is a grace
which all may receive or reject. Rahner explains that with
this grace present to all, all may find relief and security
from any forlorness or estrangement in their life. He
wr i tes :
It is the person who in the forlorness of his guilt
still turns in trust to the mystery of his existence
which is quietly present, and surrenders himself as one
who even in his guilt no longer wants to understand
himself in a sel f -centered and self-sufficient way, it
is this person who experiences himself as one who does
not forgive himself, but who is forgiven, and he
experiences the forgiveness for which he receives as the
hidden, forgiving and liberating love of God himself,
who forgives in that he gives himself, because only in
this way can there really be forgiveness once and for
al 1 .1 0
So it is seen that with the self-communication of God,
there is a real and loving grace offered to all people, with
real and objective benefits. This is both as God attributes
the benefits and as people accept them. With the knowledge
then in mind of God's proffered grace in human transcendental
experience, the preliminary basis has been layed in order to
understand Rahner's doctrine of salvation history.
Rahner understands that humanity actualizes its essence
in history. To put it more precisely, Rahner describes it
this way:
[M]an as subject and as person is a historical being in
such a way that he is historical precisely as. a
transcendent subject; his subjective essence of
10 Rahner, 131.
66
unlimited t r ans cenda 1 i t y is mediated historical Iv to
him in his knowledge and in his free self-
real i zat ion. 1 i
The implications of this are that the human experience of
God's s e 1 f - commun i cat i on occur neither unh i s t or i cal 1 y , or as
part of an unchanging, timeless experience. On the other
hand, human t ranscendal i ty is not to be thought of in terms
of a purely "temporal duration of a physical or biological
phenomenon ." 1 2 No, the history of t r ans cenda 1 i t y in
humankind is a history of the actions of humanity within and
in response to the actions of God.
Rahner is clear that the history of salvation is a
history which has its primacy in the action of God. This is
seen in that all of human history is grounded in the free and
loving s e 1 f -commun i cat i on of God. is Yet in this initiation
which is given by God, there is, on the other side, the free
response of humanity to God's initiatory grace. To God's
offer of free grace, humanity can give a transcendental Yes
or No in response. Rahner thus states that the history of
God's salvific acts is also the history of human salvation.
The history of God's revelation is also the history of human
faith.
This cannot be construed, however, as a synergistic
11 Rahner, 140.
12 Rahner, 140.
13 Rahner, 141.
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process. There is a synthesis of the divine and human
processes in salvation history, but the process as a whole is
initiated and grounded in God's activity. "God is the ground
of man's act of freedom, and in his own act he burdens man
with the grace and the responsibility for his own accountable
acts. "14 Rahner's thought on history is not to be confused
with a process development. God is other than the finite and
is not dependent upon it. Yet God is able to communicate his
essence into humanity's transcendental experience through
history.
As this is the case, it follows that God has
communicated His reality and grace of salvation through all
parts of the world through all times. Yet this reality is
communicated into the corporeality of human history. As it
is given in its purity to the unthematic consciousness of
humankind, it has not been without the by-product of explicit
reflection. The human being as a whole person cannot simply
live on the reality of implicit and immediate transcendental
consciousness alone. The immediate and transcendental
reality of divine communication to humans will inevitably be
attempted to be recaptured in thematic reflection.
This is primarily for the reason that religious
consciousness needs to be placed in a form of mediation. i5
14 Rahner, 142.
15 Rahner, 144.
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This explicit form of mediation is the reason for cultic
ritual and relig-ious societies throughout all time and space
of historical human consciousness. The mediated thematic
will always fall short of representing the pure reality of
divine experience. However, it is a necessary by-product,
and for that reason is not to be shunned.
Rahner is clear that the ideas about God have their
source of origin from the realty of God. Humanity can never
have anything to do with God except that it has already been
born by His grace. i6 By this Rahner is not saying that there
are not depraved interpretations of God, and sinful
rejections of His sel f -communi cat ion.
But there is no history of religion which is the
founding of religion by man alone, so that God then,
fixed categorically in time and space, would come to
meet this activity of man as its confirmation or
condemnation and judgement.! t
The explicit interpretations, those both right and wrong, are
nothing less than attempts to thematically grasp God's
communication of His transcendent reality. Rahner affirms
that Catholics must uphold the idea of God's universal
salvific will and revelation against the pessimism of such
theologians as Augustine and Calvin. is
Now, having briefly discussed Rahner's doctrine of God's
16 Rahner, 146.
17 Rahner, 146.
18 Rahner, 147.
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universal salvific will throughout all of history, there is
an important and critical distinction Rahner draws within the
context of this thinking. This distinction relates to the
general and official histories of salvation. The general
history of salvation has to do with that which has already
been discussed: God's universal s e 1 f - communi cat i on and
salvif ic-wi 1 1 for all of humanity throughout all history.
The official history of salvation has to do with that reality
of God's acts in time in which He has given an explicit
knowledge of Himself. This is the history of revelation as
it is contained in the Old and New Testaments, and most
specifically exemplified in the revelation of Jesus Christ.
The official history of revelation has appeared for two
reasons: 1) that humanity may have a more adequate self-
understanding of their religiosity, and 2) that Christ could
be the ultimate salvific act, on the part of God, in
redemption of humanity's lostness. Rahner states that the
history of revelation contained in the Old and New
Testaments, the prophets and the apostles give the correct
ob j ect i f i cat i on of divine transcendental experience. God
through His sel f -communi cat ion to the apostles and prophets
makes the knowledge of Himself explicit. "For we are dealing
with the se 1 f - int erpr e t at i on of the reality which is
constituted by the personal sel f -communi cat ion of God, and
hence by God himself. "i9
�
19 Rahner, 158 .
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Rahner says that the inspired prophets and apostles of
the scriptures are grasping to understand the same I i ght of
f th which has been given to all religions. It is the same
sel f-coBttmuni cat ion of God.
Looked at theologically and correctly, the prophet is
none other than the believer who can express his
transcendental experience of God correctly. Perhaps as
distinguished from other believers, it is expressed in
the prophets in such a way that it becomes for others
too the correct and pure ob j ect i f i cat ion of their own
transcendental experience of God, and it can be
recognized in its correctness and purity. zo
In this way, the concreteness of the historical reality of
God in transcendental experience is made explicit. It is
such that a community of faith can more fully and adequately
appreciate and live, that which is immediately implicit to
them. 2 1
More importantly, though, is that the ultimate act of
God's sel f -communi cat ion is brought forth most explicitly in
the incarnation of Jesus Christ. 22 Rahner goes so far to say
that the incarnation and the salvific action of Jesus Christ
in history is the abso lut e se 1 f -communi cat i on of God. Rahner
says that the se 1 f -communi cat i on of God in Jesus Christ is
absolute "because we are dealing with the definitive
salvation of the whole person and of the human race, and not
with a particular situation of man. "23
20 Rahner, 159.
21 Rahner, 161.
22 Rahner, 142.
23 Rahner, 205.
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God's s e 1 f -commun i cat i on and salvation in Christ is absolute
and definitive.
Yet, for the def ini t i veness of its salvific reality,
Rahner points out that it is an outflow of God's universal
salvific will, and not the basis of that salvific will.
Rahner explains that it is not easy to see how the cross of
Christ could be the reason for God's universal salvific will
(I Tim. 2:4), for there would have been nothing to predicate
Christ's decision to go the cross in the first place. For
God's saving will to be related solely to Christ would be
meaningless from the beginning and would "contradict the fact
that through the saving will of God Jesus Christ is meant
from the very beginning to be the redeemer of the world. "2*
Though Christ constitutes a particularity in salvation
history in time and space, its efficacy is manifested
throughout the universal history of salvation. How, then, is
this appropriated for those followers of differing beliefs
than Christianity? Rahner answers this question generally
with the idea that Christ is present through faith. This is
the kind of faith which appropriates the
" al 1 -encompass ing
and al 1 -per vas i ve mystery of reality..., the mystery which we
call God, "is present' for our salvation, offering
forgiveness and divine life. ..."25 This is offered in such a
24 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 17,
tr. Margaret Kohl (New York: Cross Road Pub., 1981), 45.
25 Rahner, Foundat i ons . 205.
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way that is final and irrevocable.
It is here that the clarification needs to be made that
the appropriation of God's universal salvific will is made
divinely effective through the agency of the Holy Spirit. It
is through the Spirit that those who hold to an explicit form
of Christianity and those who hold to an implicit form are
born of God. It is fully the regenerative power that makes
both the possibility and the effectiveness of God's
salvation. It is on this basis in which Rahner asserts that
"Christ is present and operative in non-Christian believers
and hence non-Christian religions in and through his
Spi r i t . 2 6
Rahner seeks through scholastic categories to show how
the Spirit of Christ appropriates the salvation merited by
Christ. In this way Rahner refers to the Spirit as the
ent e 1 echy of the whole universal history of salvation and
revelat ion. 2 T By entelechy, Rahner means that the Spirit is
the universal potentiality of salvation manifesting Himself
in the regenerative process of them who respond to His grace
in faith. Yet Jesus Christ is the final cause and ultimate
teleological manifestation of the salvific will of God that
is actualized in the inner reality of the Spirit. 28
26 Rahner, Foundat i ons . 316.
27 Rahner, Foundat ions . 317.
28 Rahner, Foundat i ons . 317.
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Now the Spirit actualizes His salvific process in
congruity with the concreteness of historical mediation.
This mediation is necessary for the process of human
historicity. As such, Jesus Christ is the high point of the
Holy Spirit's historical mediation. Rahner explains:
[ I ]n so far as the event of Christ is the final cause of
the communication of the Spirit to the world, it can
truly be said that this Spirit is everywhere and from
the outset the Spirit of Jesus Chr i s t , the Logos of God
became man. The Spirit who has been communicated to the
world has himself, and not only in the intention of God
which transcends the world and would be extrinsic to
him, an intrinsic relation to Jesus Christ. 29
Between the Spirit and Christ there is a relational
difference. In that difference, however, there is a mutual
conditioning so that the final effect and the cause are still
the same . 3 o
SteBoming from the issue of the Spirit's appropriation of
Christ's salvific merit is the problem of how the historic
particularity of the Christ event can be appropriated by the
human subject in the non-particularity of transcendental
experience. The problem does not have so much to do with the
idea of God's sel f -communi cat ion . Rahner has dealt
sufficiently with this through the notions of the entelechy
of the Spirit and the final causality of Christ. What is
more at issue is the eschatalogi cal direction for which
salvation history and the definitives of human freedom finds
29 Rahner, Foundat i ons , 318.
30 Rahner, Foundat i ons , 318.
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itself directed.
The problem can be more clearly stated in other words:
Humanity is called to actualize itself in freedom toward a
def ini t i veness and finality of action, a fulfillment and
realization of being. The ultimate salvific act of Christ is
the manifestation of the fulfillment and finality of God's
se 1 f -communi cat i on . So it is clear that humanity is called
to the finality of freedom, toward the finality of Christ's
salvific action. The problem occurs, though, with the
generality and non-particularity of human transcendental
experience of the divine. For how is the finality and
particularity for which universal salvation history aims to
be realized in the generality of human transcendental
experience? To this critical question the paper now turns.
In response to the critical question just raised, Rahner
finds support in his doctrine of memory. When Rahner refers
to memory, he does not mean simply the ability of
recollecting past events. Memory as Rahner uses it has the
rootage of its ideas in Plato and Augustine. si At its base
31 Augustine writes: "Great is the power of memory, an
awe-inspiring mystery, my God, a power of profound infinite
multiplicity... See the broad plains and caves and caverns of
my memory. The varieties there cannot be counted, and are,
beyond any reckoning, full of inumerable things. Some are
there through images, as in the case of all physical
objects, some in the immediate presence like intellectual
skills, some by indefinable notions or recorded impressions,
as in the case of the mind's emotions, which the memory
retains even when the mind is not experiencing them... I run
through all these things, I fly here and there, and penetrate
their working as far as I can. see: Augustine, Confess ions ,
tr. Henry Chadwick (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992), book
10 , sec . 26 .
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Rahner describes it as an "a priori principle of expectation,
of searching, of hoping. "32 The capacity of memory allows
the human subject to experience historical reality as
historical. Memory allows history to be experienced in its
reality because it gives the human subject the categories by
which to search, expect, and to hope for ultimate truth or
ultimate salvation. As one opens himself up to this a priori
category of experience, he does so in faith toward the
ultimate and enduring expectation of salvation.
The anticipation that is within the experience of memory
is not necessarily one which seeks its experience out in
concrete history. Rather it is an anticipation that endures
history and remains open to it. It is an orientation toward
the incomprehensible mystery of God. 33 This orientation is,
however, mediated through the concreteness of history. This
historical mediation can have the most varied contents and
does not have to be composed of a religious thematic. This
is not of acute importance at the level of transcendental
experience. What is important is that the capacity of memory
has a structure in which its individual elements each
have a different place in time and space, and do not all
possess the same significance. The searching
anticipation which characterizes this structure belongs
to the very essence of this memory. Insofar as history
is a history of freedom... the capacity [of memory
allows one] to make a decision of final and definitive
validity. 34
32 Rahner, Foundat i ons . 319.
33 Rahner, Foundat i ons . 320.
34 Rahner, Foundat i ons . 320.
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Throug-h the capacity of memory, humanity has the ability
in transcendental openness to seek that which has true and
lasting- validity. The ongoing chain of events can be sorted
out in such a way so that what is of permanent and lasting
validity can be recognized and affirmed for personal
significance. On the ground of the memory's capacity Rahner
thinks the gulf is bridged between the orientation toward
particularity in salvation history and the generality of
transcendental experience. The ultimacy in Christ does not
have to become a tangibly identical aim in salvation history
for all people. The human memory in conjunction with God's
gracious s e 1 f -communi cat i on "searches in hope and in
anticipation for that event in history in which a free
decision about the salvific outcome of history is made and
becomes tangible. "35
The basis from which Rahner has developed his doctrine
of anonymous Christianity is now evident. Within the scope
and history of God's universal salvific plan, one may
appropriate Christ's merited activity without having an
explicit knowledge of having done so. Those who acquire the
salvific reality implicitly without knowing so explicitly are
incorporated into the community of believers: the church, but
their membership is not cognitively realized. Thus, these
are anonymous Christians.
35 Rahner, Foundat ions . 320-21 .
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The question which now arises is the compatibility of
Rahner's doctrine of anonymous Christianity with his
understanding of human sinfulness. As far as a test for
consistency and coherence, Rahner's doctrine of anonymous
Christianity appears to square with his understanding of
human sinfulness. Yet within this consistency it does not
appear to be without its problems. Some of the pros and cons
of Rahner's understanding of the anthropological situation
within a universal salvation history will now be explored.
Rahner's understanding of human sinfulness as a break
from the human transcendental orientation and fulfillment
appears on target. Ultimate spirituality is moving away from
se 1 f -autonomy toward the sel f -communi cat ion of God offered in
grace. This grace is manifested immanently right in the
immediate realm of human experience. It is a grace which
holds humans responsible to act in freedom. Because of this
Rahner states that "there can and must be present in every
such act an unthematic yes' or no' to this God of original,
transcendental exper i ence .
" 3 6
One's accountability and realization of God is an ever
present occurrence, though most of the time it is not
cognitively realized. It also appears that Rahner says human
accountability to God cannot be realized. One can never know
for sure if one has willfully sinned or has been motivated by
36 Rahner, Foundat i ons . 98.
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forces for which he was unequipped to regulate.
The actual situation of a person's freedom... is not
completely accessible to reflection, to examination of
conscience which would be understood as a definitive
statement of absolute certainty. A person never knows
with absolute certainty whether the objectively guilty
character of his actions, which he can perhaps establish
unambiguously, is the ob j ect i f i cat i on of a real and
original decision of freedom saying no' to God, or
whether it is more in the nature of a manipulation which
has been imposed upon him and which he endures, and
which has about it the character of necessity. 37
By this Rahner is not saying one cannot know the
subjective reality of personal guilt, for this is something
he does affirm. Rather, the ob j ec t i f i ca t i on of incremental
acts of sin cannot be positively known. One can only
understand sinfulness and guilt by the whole of reality, as
it stands in the horizon of freedom and transcendence. The
finite particulars are not completely verifiable.
This understanding of sinfulness is conunendable in that
it takes into account the universal dimensions of sin. Sin,
for Rahner, is not privatized or segmented into the limiting
consequential factors of individualism. For Rahner the scope
of sin is a violation against the whole universal ground upon
which finite reality stands. This appears to do justice to
the biblical emphasis regarding the ultimacy of universal
human accountability to God, as the creator and sustainer of
all creati on .
A problem which Rahner appears to encounter, though, is
37 Rahner, Foundat i ons . 104.
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that his scheme of human t ranscendal i ty is unable to account
for the personalness and humaness of sin in sinfulness. To
understand what is meant by this, it is necessary to
demonstrate some of the problematic elements of Rahner's
construction of human t ranscendal i ty . These revolve around
the classic question of the contact between nature and grace
in theology. How closely is the supernaturalness of grace
and the naturalness of creation linked together?
It would appear in the theology of Rahner, they are
linked too closely. To have God's sel f -communi cat i on so
closely tied with in the natural processes of human activity
does harm to the distinctiveness and personalness of relation
between God and humanity. This does not go to say that there
is no indirect or analogical knowledge of God given by grace
in nature. Yet to intricately relate the natural
t ranscendal i ty of humanity with the manifestation of God's
forgiving grace is too extreme.
Rahner does not seek in his theological formulation to
destroy the t ranscendal i ty of God. In fact, he seeks to
protect God's transcendence from being too closely tied with
human finitude by structuring the pure knowledge of God with
in the structure of non- themat i c , unreflective human
transcendal i ty. This, however, is precisely the problem.
Though Rahner guards against the notion of gaining a pure
knowledge of God through idealistic rationality, he appears
to fall into an equal blunder by making the knowledge of God
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founded on an existential and subjective non- r a t i ona 1 i t y .
God is a personal being and He is nothing short of
personal. He cannot be known as a set of formulas, because
formulas do not deal with personhood. Rahner has captured
and explained this notion very well. On the other hand, God
cannot be known or embraced as pure mystery. Mystery is an
unexplained reality upon which there can be no substantive
content to the human knower. God, though, is person, with
definable attributes and characteristics. Though God in His
fulness cannot be comprehended. He must to some degree be
apprehended. To the degree that God is not cognitively
apprehended is the degree to which He is not known, and vice-
a- ver sa .
Rahner states that God can be known as mystery without
being cognitively apprehended. If this is so. He is not
known as a person, but as something less. This reduction of
the knowledge of God to an ineffable unknown appears to
reduce God to something other than He is in His personalness.
As such, it is inadequate for developing a model of
theological comprehens ion. 3 s Moreover, in that it
inadequately understands God, it brings an inadequate
understanding of human nature and the human situation.
This is because humanity is created in the image of God.
38 As Earth asserts in his treatment of Anselm: faith
must seek itself out in understanding or it is not complete.
There must be some cognitive fulfilling of immediate
r eve 1 at i on .
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Humanity has also strayed from the perfection of God's image.
As such the transcendental and personal God must reveal to
humanity who they are, in a way that can objectively relate
to the rationality of their humanity, in light of His
creation and purpose, and in their falleness. Rahner,
however, blurs these categorical distinctions in the realm of
the undefined, non-conceptual t ranscendal i ty of human nature.
As such, humanity is unable to gain an adequate knowledge of
themselves because the ground of their personhood in buried
in the amorphous, non-thematic actuality of a knowledge which
is incapable of being cognitively grasped.
In this way, human accountability and relatability to
God cannot be concretely determined. The primacy and
actuality of its substance is too vague and transcendental to
be relatedly discussed in concrete terms. Thus, sin cannot
be understood in the concreteness of personhood and humanity.
In this realm it can never be known for sure, for it is not
here that sin is committed. Sin is committed in the realm of
one's transcendental horizon. Though this is the touching
point between God and humanity, it is not an adequate
touching point for human understanding and relatability. It
is a realm which cannot account for both the personhood of
either God or humanity. Thus, if one seeks to locate sin in
this area, it will be done at the expense of negating the
concreteness and humaness of sin in human sinfulness.
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Another problem with Rahner's transcendental
understanding of Christianity is that its salvific
orientation appears to be too oriented towards human
subjectivity rather than the objectivity of God's grace.
Rahner's theology is devoid of easy or cheap grace, and it
does call for integrity of life before the will of God. This
is commendable. Yet, salvation for Rahner is based on self-
authenticity relating to God's grace rather than a salvation
which leads to s e 1 f -authent i c i ty based and resting on God's
grace .
Rahner makes this contention:
Anyone who does not close himself to God in an ultimate
act of his life and his freedom through free and
personal sin which he is really and subjectively guilty
and for which he cannot shirk responsibility, this
person finds salvation. 39
Salvation is based on one's openness in authenticity to the
one's transcendental self. "[ E ] very thing of significance for
salvation is to be illuminated by referring it back to...
transcendental being. "^o if a person does not live his life
in authenticity to the best of his ability then salvation is
forfeited due to guilt.
Rahner, however, is not an advocate of works
righteousness. This is because one cannot truly know whether
any individual act or work one does is sinful or righteous.
39 Rahner, Foundat i ons . 143.
40 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 9, tr.
Graham Harrison (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972), 143.
83
This is an area of data not fully open to human judgement
since it is a part of t ranscendal i ty . One must rather give
himself in openness to the ground of all reality which is
beyond his finitude. As already observed, the objective
mediatory elements which this will involve vary and are not
of primary importance. What is important is that one is
fully accountable and responsible to the ground of freedom,
which is the ever present grace of God calling for a
righteous decision.
Rahner in the case of salvation, as with human
sinfulness, seems to have made the mistake of aligning too
closely the reality of God into the natural and organic
processes of humanity. Salvation is not something offered in
a distinctly objective way which one can base one's
spirituality and self-authenticity. It is linked right in
the human process because the reality of God is also linked
there, also. Thus, in order to be in a r ight relation to
God, it is incumbent upon an individual to be in r ight
relation to self, whatever that might mean through the
variations of mediatorial forms which it is to be acted out.
It must be granted that this critique has been mainly
directed at Rahner's idea of implicit or anonymous
Christianity, and has not sought to bring to bear the
explicit and objective understanding Rahner has of the
Christian faith. Granting this, however, it needs to be
realized that the explicit form of Christianity as
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exemplified in Christ is only a secondary addition to
implicit Christianity. At the heart of the substance,
though, the implicit and explicit Christianity in Rahner's
formulation is really the same. "In theological terms the
light of faith' which is offered to every person, and the
light by which the "prophets' grasp and proclaim the divine
message from the center of human existence is the same
light."''! Therefore, any critique made of Rahner's implicit
Christianity applies in substance to Rahner's understanding
of explicit Christianity.
There are more aspects of Rahner's doctrine to be
examined in the next chapter. Suffice it to say for now,
Rahner's understanding of human sinfulness and salvation fall
short of a healthy anthropological conception by the fact
that Rahner blurs the distinctive relations between the
human and the divine. Authent i cness and personalness of
relation on both sides are hampered because the divine and
human are made to function in a way that is less than
personal. J.I. Packer, touching on a similar emphasis,
writes:
Evangelical theology is at war with all views which
graft salvation on to natural goodness or revelation on
to natural knowledge, on the view that both views fail
to grasp the sinfulness of sin and the graciousness of
grace . * 2
41 Rahner, Foundat i ons , 159.
42 Donald Bloesch, Essentials of Evangelical Theology.
3 vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 1: 213.
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CHAPTER 4
Having looked to some extent at Rahner's thought, it
will now be necessary to contrast his position with
Pannenberg's and see what alternative Pannenberg offers to
the issue of salvation and human sinfulness. A similar
method will be followed in examining Pannenberg's thought as
was used with Rahner. There will be an analysis of the
consistency of his thought with regard to sin and salvation,
and the soundness of his theological approach will be
evaluated. This will be done with special comparison to
Rahner .
Pannenberg, as seen, has a stronger awareness of the
human predicament of sinfulness than does Rahner. One's
alienation of sel f -ident i ty and blindness as to the nature of
one's true identity cannot be easily overcome. Pannenberg
relates this counsel when speaking of those caught in their
sinful condition: "Good advice is of little avail... The
bondage of the will calls... for a liberation and, in the
radical case, for a redemption that will establish the will"s
identity anew."i This comment is consistent with the
conclusions drawn in the second chapter which stated that
Pannenberg's anthropology leaves no assurance that a person,
through critical s el f -r ef 1 ect i on , can discover the
1 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological
Ppr.�;pective, tr. Mattew J. O'Connel (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1985), 118-19.
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objectivity of personal sinfulness. The precar i ousness of
self-understanding is much to fragile for gaining an honest
sel f -under s tanding . It is on this ground that Pannenberg
seeks to place a greater emphasis on the need for explicit
divine revelation for attaining s e 1 f -authent i cat i on . Thus
Pannenberg quotes Splett in saying that human beings need to
be "awakened to themselves by a creative summons. "2 There
must be given an external impartation of understanding so
humans can be brought to the freedom for which they are
dest ined.
To the issue of coming to sel f -understanding Pannenberg
argues that the basis must start with the revelation of Jesus
Christ. By understanding Christ there can be both a
"transforming [of] the already existing reality of man and
his historical question about himself. "3 Christ, who is the
second Adam, demonstrates and makes way the realization of
authentic human existence. Pannenberg sees Christ, the
second man, to be the fulfillment of all that was longed for
to complete the first man. This is contrasted to the Greek
view of humanity which sees the essentiality of mankind in
terms of an unchanging essence. Pannenberg argues, though,
that the Christian teaching is that the original man was put
2 Pannenberg, 115.
3 Wolfhart Pannenberg, "The Chr istological Foundation
of Christian Anthropology." Humanism and Christianity, ed.
Claude Geffre, tr. David Smith (New York: Herder and Herder,
1973), 87.
in a state of history that was to be resolved in future
ant i cipat i on . 4
It is important to pause and to distinguish the view
just presented with the traditional view that the original
Adam was in a state of paradisiacal perfection. This
perspective teaches that the coming of Christ was to bring
humanity to a restoration of the original perfection
possessed by the first parents of humanity. Pannenberg, in
contrast, maintains that Paul did not teach that the first
man was in a state of perfection. If one wants to hold to
this view on tenuous premises, then it will become "almost
impossible to incorporate a Christian understanding of man
into a purely natural anthropology . "5
Looking at the Pauline scheme of the relation between
the first and the second Adam Pannenberg believes that a
positive and necessary contribution to understanding the
salvation of humanity can be made. In Christ there is seen
new aim for which all humanity, as fundamentally connected
with Adam, are to move. This new aim consists in Christ's
resurrection. 6 This is contrasted with the Greeks who saw
nothing of great value in humanity except the iimnortal soul.
The resurrection of Jesus, however, applies not only to the
4 Pannenberg, "Chr i s to 1 ogi cal Foundat i on , 89.
5 Pannenberg, "Chr i s to 1 ogi cal Foundat i on , 89.
6 Pannenberg, "Chr istological Foundat i on , 90.
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soul, but also the body. Christ reveals a future that
relates to the whole essence of humanity. t
Who Christ is in His revelation reveals pr o 1 ept i cal ly
what all of humanity's future is to be. In Christ is
revealed and given the manifestation of the love of God and
the hope of humanity. Christ as God is part of the self-
revelation of God. Christ is the revelation of God to
humanity showing them what God has called humanity to be
like. God calls humanity to self-realization in freedom with
their destiny. This destiny is manifest for all to see in
the revelation of Christ. "This is a direct consequence of
the fundamental assumption that the first man is not yet in
possession of his destiny-he only possesses it with the
appearance of Jesus Christ. "8
Pannenberg contends that any who would participate in
the destiny and life revealed in Christ must do so "by faith
and baptism and by the working of the Spirit and the love of
God. "9 Unless there is belief and an entering into the will
of God, one cannot participate in the revelation of Jesus
Christ. Pannenberg, unlike Rahner, does not slip in any idea
that the reality of Christ's revelation can be participated
in by an unthematic or non-cognitive kind of faith. "On the
7 Pannenberg, "Chr i s to 1 ogi cal Foundation," 90.
8 Pannenberg, "Chr i s to 1 ogi cal Foundation," 94.
9 Pannenberg, "Christological Foundation," 93.
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contrary, it has its basis in an event which is a matter for
knowing and which becomes known to us only by more or less
inadequate inf ormat ion. "i o
Pannenberg grants that there are levels of understanding
by which the knowledge of God's revelation in Christ is
grasped. In order to have faith, though, one must at least
presuppose the truth and correctness of God's revelation.
Faith presupposes knowledge- "Knowledge is not a stage
beyond faith, but leads into faith-and the more exact it is,
the more certainty it does so."ii It is seen, then, that
Pannenberg's ep i s t emo 1 ogi cal order of knowing does not have
room for an implicit, non-cognitive understanding of the
gospel. For the exactness of one's knowledge of God's
historical revelation determines the degree of one's faith.
In fact Pannenberg is antagonistic to the idea of a
purely subjective and implicit faith:
Christian faith must not be merely equated with a merely
subjective conviction that would allegedly compensate
for the uncertainty of our historical knowledge about
Jesus. Such a conviction would only be self-
delus ion. i 2
The objectivity of knowledge is something Pannenberg sees to
be essential to faith. The objective comprehension of God's
10 Wolfhart Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in
Jesus of Nazareth." Theology as History, eds . James M.
Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr., (New York: Harper & Row,
Pub., 1967), 128.
11 Pannenberg, "Revelation of God," 129.
12 Pannenberg, "Revelation of God," 131.
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breaking into human history is indispensable for our
knowledge of Him. Any lack of understanding in this area
cannot be buttressed by a faith experience. This is contrary
to the human pattern and way of knowing.
At this point there needs to be made an important
interjection. This has to do with Pannenberg's understanding
of the history of religions. Pannenberg sees the need to
establish an anthropological understanding of the religious
nature of humanity. He wants to show that talk about God is
not merely a subjective need which follows purely from human
insecurity or delusion. Rather, he wants to demonstrate that
the idea of God, as is seen in one form or another through
out history, is something fitting and constitutive of a
genuine understanding of humanity. Not only this, but he
desires to establish the phenomenologi cal discussion of
religion within a strong theocentric basis.
As the phenomenon of religion is discussed, it needs to
be established not as a reality that is based in humanity.
It needs to be seen as a reality which stems from God as the
creator of humanity. Pannenberg works in this direction for
the reason that an understanding of God is the presupposition
behind a history and destiny that is fulfilled in Christ.
Pannenberg speaking of Christ as He was intimately related to
the Jewish context writes: "Only through Jesus does it
become clear what the God of Israel really is and means. And
yet this final understanding presupposes a knowledge of this
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God prior to it and also a hope for God's presence. "13
The key here in this statement is that Israel in
accepting Christ had already been conditioned toward that in
that they had a knowledge of Him and anticipated His
presence. Pannenberg, thus, argues that the knowledge of
Christ cannot be thought of as productive for the human
condition, unless the revelation that is seen in Him is
understood in the light of a primary understanding of deity
and an anticipation of some sal vat i on through that deity.
Pannenberg is right when he states that the gentiles do
not share the same presuppositions as that of the Jews. How
then do the gentiles come into the knowledge and realization
of Christ as the savior? If this is a question which
Protestants remain to leave unanswered, the revelation of
Christ can hardly be considered of importance to all people.
But if we are convinced that human religious experiences
and ideas are not merely fantastic images, but that they
deal with a reality sui generis-in whatever queer and
inadequate way this divine reality may have been
understood by different religions-if we are aware of
something "behind' these, of something that we have to
consider seriously, then also the God of Israel attains
the status of a reality for us. Then it becomes
relevant to ask wherein may consist his peculiarity as
distinguished from other deities of other religions.
To comprehend more fully what Pannenberg is seeking to
accomplish with the themes just mentioned, the idea of human
exocentricity must be reiterated. Except this time it must
13 Pannenberg, "Revelation of God,
" 104.
14 Pannenberg, "Revelation of God," 105.
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be done so within the scheme of historical consciousness and
progress. Humans are beings who are primarily open to that
which is beyond themselves. This does not only apply to the
immediate spatial and temporal terms of their environment.
It applies to the meaning of their lives as a history not yet
fulfilled and waiting to be realized. What humanity is is
not a given. It is something, rather, which is in process.
Pannenberg agrees with Dilthey who sees the historical
process as one of finding meaning only as the future and the
past are seen as reciprocally conditioning each other. "The
significance of a particular event is grasped only when in
lived experience the particular impression is related to the
whole of life. "15 This whol e includes the past, present, and
the future. The future, though, is unknown. Although it is
unknown, it is a future to which all humanity by nature of
their being is waiting and living in openness.
Only in light of the future shall the past and the
present be fully realized. This remains to be seen in
waiting and expectation. It is in this conjunction that
Pannenberg places great emphasis on the Pauline thematic of
the history and realization between the first and the second
Adam. The second Adam shows the first Adam as a process in
history waiting to be fulfilled and realized.
This is clearly the reason Pannenberg places such
15 Pannenberg, Anthro . . 511.
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emphasis on the revelatory knowledge gained through the life
and ministry of Christ.
In the history of Jesus a future was anticipated that
has not yet appeared in its general bearing. Therefore
those who penetrate into the meaning of Jesus' history
will inevitably be led to God's not yet accomplished
future, which nevertheless is held to have appeared
already in and with Jesus when one speaks of his
resurrection from the dead.ie
This is what Pannenberg contends regarding those who do not
walk and live in the light of this revelation. They are not
yet bound in the freedom which God desires them to have.
They are still living in the presence and continuity of the
first Adam. This continuity only supplies a general
revelation of the awareness of divine reality and a basic
openness to this reality in the historical process. It is
Christ who provides an objective orientation into what the
meaning and future of life holds.
In order to take seriously, then, the specific reality
of the true God for humanity as revealed in Christ,
Pannenberg argues that the general religious situation of
humanity through history needs to be taken seriously. Christ
must be realized as the ultimate fulfillment of the concrete
history of humanity. It is Christ who opens the door for
human destiny in freedom. Without this reality in a person's
life, there is an incompleteness and a barrier in the way to
the realization of authentic humanity.
16 Pannenberg, "Dogmatic Theses," 130.
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So far the discussion of the authenticity of human
existence in Pannenberg's thought has been rather general.
It is now in order, since a general foundation has been laid
for understanding Pannenberg's anthropology, to discover how
he perceives an authentic existence in Christ is more
specifically worked out.
Pannenberg in speaking of the way to salvation sees the
apostle Paul as communicating in a clear fashion that one
needs to die with Christ in the hope of being raised with
Him. If In light of Paul's assertion, Pannenberg raises the
question as to the meaning of death to self. Another way of
putting it is: who is the i nmo s t self of Rom. 7:22 which
delights in God as opposed to the old self which is alienated
and estranged to God? Is it purely the new Adam which
relates to the realization of one's destiny in God, or is it
somehow linked with the always existing ego or empirical
self?
In answer to these questions, Pannenberg gives an
affirmative response to the idea that salvation and self-
authentication have to do with both the empirical self and
the new Adam. Pannenberg starts off by saying that the
inmost self of Rom. 7:22 cannot be viewed as the ego of the
natural man. "Rather, it is the human person as seen in the
light of a person's destiny to salvation in Christ." From
17 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Christian Spirituality
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1983), 97-98.
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this perspective, Pannenberg goes on to elaborate, that the
"ego of the person I have been is profoundly different from
what I consider myself to be, and yet it is i dent i cal ." i �
At this point Pannenberg's focus on spiritual conversion
becomes very interesting. When a Christian examines his life
in the scheme of originally being in Adam and subsequently
being in Chr i s t . there will be noticed traces of the i n
Chr i st while being in Adam. i a The self of a person when
being in Christ is not changed, it is rather transformed and
fulfilled. This revolves around Pannenberg's insight that
all humanity, even those apart from Christ, are still
oriented toward an idea of the divine and a need to be
fulfilled in its presence.
A person who is alienated from his destiny is still a
human being nonetheless, created in God's image. God still
provides His love in natural grace and revelation toward that
person. Even with this understanding of natural grace,
Pannenberg insists that those in continuity with the first
Adam need a measure of supernatural grace. This is a grace
directed toward the center of one's identity which brings a
transformation and reconst i tut ion of sel f-understanding.2 o
Pannenberg leans heavily on the insights of Luther at
18 Pannenberg,
19 Pannenberg,
20 Pannenberg,
Spir i tual i ty . 98 .
Spi r i tual i t.v . 98 .
Spirituality. 99 .
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this point. Luther, in line with a Pauline emphasis, taught
that in the event of regeneration, the subject himself is
changed and not just some quality in the subject. 21 This is
in focus with Luther's teaching that we are justified outside
ourselves in Christ. To go outside oneself means that there
has to be a transforming of identity which is beyond the old
self. "It is the power of faith that it places us outside
ourselves, because in the act of trust our existence is built
on the one to whom we entrust ourselves, to whom we quite
literally leave our sel ves . "2 2
Yet this power to move outside ourselves is not a power
which can be enacted by the old man. It is an act which must
be engaged through a strength which enables people to be
carried beyond themselves. This going out beyond self is
able to be accomplished through the revelation of Christ.
In him we find our true freedom, the authentic self
beyond what we were before. And yet, because of the
saving love and promise of Christ offered to the sinner,
it is our own self, the true identity of the person we
were even before, now finally achieved, liberated not
from some external bondage but from bondage to our old
self .2 3
The transforming power of God which is appropriated by faith,
Pannenberg contends, is grounded in none other than an
explicit revelation of Christ. This is a revelation of grace
21 Pannenberg, Spi r i tual i ty . 99.
22 Pannenberg, Spirit ua lit y. 99.
23 Pannenberg, Spirit ua lity. 99-100.
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extending personally from the love of God, authentically to
the identity of the recipient.
In Pannenberg's understanding of regeneration there is
witnessed the need for a radical transformation of the human
subject against the radical effects and state of sin. This
discovery is consistent with the observations of Pannenberg's
understanding of the ego in relati on to the self, as seen in
chapter two of this thesis. The ego is positioned on and
reciprocally effecting the human subject's se 1 f -cons t i tut i on .
This allows for a sel f-t ranscendal i ty toward the orientation
of freedom. Yet as Pannenberg points out, the range of
freedom to which this state allows is very narrow, and it
certainly falls short of leading one to realize one's
personal destiny and meaning in Christ. 24
There has now been given sufficient attention to
Pannenberg's soter iological emphasis with regard to salvation
history and human sinfulness. The thesis now comes to a
critical juncture where it will not only discuss the validity
and implications of Pannenberg's thought, but it will do so
also in comparison to Rahner. Not only that, but also near
the end of the thesis, the writer will draw his theological
conclusions which have sprung from the study of the
perspectives of Pannenberg and Rahner.
In chapter three of this thesis the conclusion was made
24 see: note 46 in chapter 2 of this thesis.
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that Rahner draws to close of a connection between God's
supernatural grace and humanity's natural conditi on. There
IS a blur created by Rahner's harmonization which works
against the authentic relation between God in communication
with humanity and humanity in their self-understanding. The
question now arises if Pannenberg may open himself up to
critiques of a similar or different nature.
When viewed from the perspective of keeping a balance of
distinction between God's transcendence and His immanental
relation to humanity, it does not appear that Pannenberg
crosses the line of an artificial integration between the
two. Humanity in a natural state is oriented toward an idea
and desire for God which is grounded in God's grace. Yet the
deeper reality of entering into a fulfilling relationship
with God is something that is worked out in humanity's
identity and growth. It is not simply an immediate a priori
relation, God offers Himself to humanity in a relationship
of consent .
Not only this, but God reveals Himself as person. The
fulness of God is not able to be reduced to an abstract
horizon of transcendence. Pannenberg maintains the
objectivity of the knowledge of God in His revelation. God
is known as a person who has a specific purpose for humanity
as demonstrated and provided in Jesus Christ. This is the
way God reveals Himself. A comprehension of Him cannot be
regarded as something less than personal, or else one will
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fall into the trap of idolatry.
Such a perspective of the reality of the transcendent
God coining in His personalness with purpose for humanity has
critical anthropological implications. Victor Frankl's logo-
therapeutic approach to psychotherapy appears to this writer
to affirm and compliment some of the basic and valuable
points found in Pannenberg's anthropology. This is basically
viewed from the need which Frankl sees there to be for a real
and an objective orientation in escaping all the neurotic and
pathological behaviors and states which are so common to the
human experience.
Frankl's description of the human need overlaps many of
the convictions expressed by Pannenberg:
Self-transcendence is the essence of existence. Being
human is directed toward something other than itself...
Those authors who pretend to have overcome the dichotomy
between object and subject are not aware that, as truly
phenomeno 1 og i cal analysis would reveal, there is no such
thing as cognition outside the polar field of tension
established between object and subject... One must
recognize that being human profoundly means being
engaged and entangled in a situation, and confronted
with a world whose objectivity and reality is no way
detracted from by the subjectivity of that "being' who
is "in the world'. 2*
Before progressing on, there are some points in this
quote which need some elaboration. Frankl is a psycho
therapist whose approach to sel f -understanding is deeply
informed by existentialist philosophy. Unlike some
25 Viktor E. Frankl, The Will To Meaning (New York:
Word Publishing Co., 1969), 50-51.
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interpreters of existentialism, Frankl believes that
existentialist thought can only succeed with an objective
orientation toward a reference to meeting the authentic
relation of the intentional will.
The more subjective interpretation contends that the
subjective will must authentically fulfill itself in the
meaningl essness of external and objective existence. It is
only in pure int ent i onal i ty that the ego in projection of the
self can find meaning. Frankl sees this notion as faulty,
however. This is because the human subject is not just an
intentional being, but also a self-transcendent being. 26 As
such, in intentional orientation, there is a self-
transcendent orientation to otherness in the world. The
sel f-t ranscendent orientation, then, must be taken just as
much into account as the subjective intentional orientation.
In order to do this, though, one needs to take seriously the
objectivity of the world outside of mere subjective being.
It is in this context of thinking that Frankl states:
Human beings are transcending themselves toward meanings
which are something other than themselves, which are
more than mere expressions of their selves, more than
mere projections of these selves. Meanings are
discovered but not invented. 2t
It is in this vain that Frankl sees the ultimate human need
as the wi 1 1- to-meaning . This meaning is not merely a
26 Frankl, 50.
27 Frankl, 60.
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projection of some idealized abstraction in the psychic
conscious. It is something discovered in the real world in
which humanity is a part of in historical experience.
Frankl suggests that humans long for a concrete purpose
and task to fulfill. Each individual needs a task and a
meaning oriented toward the uniqueness of the self-
transcendent nature. This task and meaning cannot be ego
oriented. "For what is demanded of man is not primarily
fulfillment and realization of himself, but the actualization
of specific tasks in his world. "28 Again, speaking in regard
to the se 1 f -transcendent nature of humanity, Frankl contends:
"Only to the extent to which man fulfills a meaning out there
in the world, does he fulfill himself. If he sets out to
actualize himself rather than fulfill a meaning, self
actualization immediately loses its jus t i f i cat ion. "2 9
Enough has been stated about Frankl's thought in this
regard. What is important is that Frankl has caught on to
the idea that human exocentricity points to the fact that
humans need a real and external meaning in relation to
themselves for authentic existence. This is precisely what
Pannenberg's theological orientation drives toward. Humanity
has an orientation toward a fulfillment in deity which can
only be directed to a real meaning and purpose in the
28 Viktor E. Frankl, From Death Camp to Existentialism,
tr. Ilse Lasch (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), 100.
29 Frankl, Will to Meaning. 38.
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revelation of Christ. Christ is the one external otherness
to which all humanity is ultimately to be directed.
A point needs now to be injected in regard to Frankl and
Pannenberg. When Frankl speaks of the will-to-meaning, what
meaning does he believe people will find if they look for
that objective meaning external to them? Frankl answers this
by saying that meaning is uni que to each person. He prefers
not to use the term relat i ve. Relativism does not allow for
the possibility of external meaning. Uniqueness, however,
signifies a quality of relation where each person must find
that which is suitable to their particular existence and
status in 1 i f e . s o
The emphasis on uniqueness, however, does not really get
too far, if at all, beyond a relativistic understanding of
meaning. For if there is not an ultimate meaning to which
all other meanings are held accountable, then one can simply
not traverse beyond the relativity of meaning. To assert the
uniqueness of meaning as opposed to the relativity of meaning
does not provide any ultimate point of reference for which
any par t i cul ar meaning can be checked with regard to its
truth content .
Pannenberg's anthropological orientation appears to move
beyond the impasse created by Frankl's uniqueness of meaning
without denying logo-therapy's valid insights. Pannenberg
30 Frankl, Will to Meaning. 54.
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writes that "a truth' that would simply be my truth and
would not at least claim to be universal and valid for every
human being could not remain true even for me."'i Pannenberg
has no association with relativity, and boldly claims the
absoluteness of truth in Christ for all humanity. Pannenberg
recognizes, however, the pr ecar i ousnes s of each human
situation in the process of identity orientation. In this
sense Pannenberg affirms what could be called a uniqueness of
understandings
In this uniqueness of understanding, Pannenberg contends
that there is a history of identity formation in coming to
understand truth. No one can take truth and force it upon a
person who is unable to understand it. In this sense there
is seen anthropologically something similar to Frankl's
uniqueness of meaning. The difference with Pannenberg is
that meaning is not unique, but the human process of
conforming to the nature and reality of that meaning is
unique from person to person. There is an exocentric
orientation in Pannenberg's anthropology which understands
the relativity of meaning as a means toward receptivity to
the absoluteness of Christ's revelation.
Thomas Oden in a 1974 article brings some confirmation
to these obs er vat i ons . 3 2 Oden expresses a good deal of hope
31 Pannenberg, Anthro . . 15.
32 Thomas C. Oden, "The Human Potential and Evangelical
Hope," Dialog 13 (1974): 121-28. The writer spoke recently
to Dr. Oden, and he said that he does not closely identify
with his earlier writings on psycho-therapy any longer.
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that Pannenberg's theological orientation might contribute a
great deal toward a reorienting of the therapeutic process.
Oden sees Pannenberg ushering in a new optimism and
rationalism moving theology "away from the introverted,
sub ject i vi zed momentum of ex i s t ent i a 1 i sm . " 3 s The subjective
and ant i -rat i onal orientation of which came out of the 50's
and 60'a created a rut of sel f - int rospect ion without a basis
for offering authentic meaning and identity. Pannenberg
presents for Oden a fresh attempt to break out of that.
This rethinking of theology can also bring a rethinking
of the therapeutic process. Oden expresses his thoughts in
this way with regard to the theology of hope:
[ T 1 her apeut i c transactions are so enmeshed in human
limitation, despair, guilt and anxiety. Therapy must
deal with those limits. I would hypothesize that if the
individual in therapy could envision and experience a
larger embrace of the historical process, and an
affirmation of its end, then that would be immensely
constructive in achieving the desired outcomes in
psychotherapy. Historical awareness is therapeutic, I
believe not only with respect to digging into one's
past, but with respect to affirming and embracing the
future, the whole future, and finally its end. 34
Here again the idea of the need to engage oneself in the
whole of objective existence for the realization of an
authentic life is reaffirmed. This can be foremostly
embraced in the revelation of Christ. Again Oden shares:
Psychology, like history, is full of inner
contradictions, but when each part is held in light of
33 Oden, 124.
34 Oden, 125.
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the anticipated whole, all contradictions are in
principle, even if not in fact, resolved and viewed
who 1 i s t i cal ly . The meaning of any event is seen in the
light of its end. For Christians, this end has appeared
in Jesus' resurrect ion. 3 s
Oden seems to correctly point out that life is full of so
many contradictions that it is difficult to conceive how one
can live authentically on a purely subjective basis. There
is needed an objective revelation by which the human subject
can be able to adequately interpret life's vicissitudes and
conf 1 i c t s .
Carl Jung offers a similar thought:
Just as man, as a social being, cannot in the long run
exist without a tie to the community, so the individual
will never find real justification for his existence,
and his own spiritual and moral autonomy, anywhere
except in an extramundane principle capable of
relativizing the overpowering influence of external
factors. 36
Jung in his psycho-therapeutic approach realizes the need for
something ultimate and beyond the mere lateral plane of being
that can give meaning to the apparent relativity and
absurdities of existence. Humanity, as socially and
outwardly connected beings, must believe in something more
reliable than themselves and their inmiediate environment.
It is now evident that Pannenberg's anthropology is at
least a plausible way of viewing the human condition.
35 Oden, 127.
36 Carl G. Jung, The Undiscovered Self, rpt. tr. R.F.C.
Hull, vol. 10 of The Collected Works of C.G. Jung.- eds.
Herbert Mead, et al . 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1964), 158.
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Rahner's anthropological approach, however, is not without
its attractors. To do justice to this evaluative process it
will be necessary to view some of positive aspects that have
been given with regard to his approach.
Niel Pembroke has developed an interesting idea by
contrasting the psychological insights of Erik Erikson with
the anthropological perspective of Rahner and developing the
affinities between the two. Pembroke's thesis is that
Rahner's understanding of the supernatural existential and
faith are nearly identical to Erikson's development of the
life cycle theory.
Erikson's life cycle represents an understanding whereby
in the course of one's life development there is the need to
develop a healthy personality. According to the aim of the
life cycle development "a healthy personality actively
mas t er s his environment, shows a unity of personality, and is
able to perceive the world and himself correct ly. t
Erikson's life cycle theory is based on the epigenetic
principle. This principle states that there is an inbuilt
ground plan by which everything grows accordingly. Every
area of growth takes on a particular time of ascendency.
"Once each part has been through its key time, the parts are
brought together to form a functional whole. "38 During each
37 Erik H. Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle (New
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1980), 53.
38 Neil Pembroke, "Anonymous Faith and the Psychology
of Identity," Christian Perspectives on Human Development.
eds. Leroy Aden, et. al . (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1992), 82.
107
level of ascendance it is necessary that when the ascendent
part integrates with the whole that it does so in continuity
and not in discordance if a healthy personality is to be
deve 1 oped .
Erikson's life cycle theory has eight stages of
development. The eight stages correspond to the virtues of
ego development. These stages are described in terms of
possible polarities to which the subject may attain. These
polarities are as follows: basic trust versus basic mistrust,
autonomy versus shame and doubt, initiative versus guilt,
industry versus inferiority, identity versus identity
confusion, intimacy versus isolation, generativity versus
stagnation, and integrity versus despair. 39
In order to successfully bridge each phase of
development it is necessary that one forms a sel f -cont inui ty
between the role and stage adjustments consigned to the
person along the epigenetic principle. Identity formation is
the key to the life cycle approach. Pembroke, then, takes
this conception and finds in it a harmonization with Rahner's
idea of anonymous faith. Pembroke sees Rahner's notion of
accepting oneself completely in faith identical with
Erikson's identity formation process.
Pembroke points out that when Rahner speaks of accepting
oneself completely, key terms which he uses are conscience
39 Pembroke, 82.
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moral Hecision.40 This follows along the line that if a
person fully walks in accordance to conscience, this person
does so in full acceptance of himself and God. This is
because this person is in tune and obedient to the
transcendental reality implicit in being. Pembroke quotes
Rahner in reference to the atheist:
To this extent the acceptance of human transcendence in
faith... can be found in an atheist... given that he is
absolutely obedient to the dictates of conscience and so
accepts himself and God, at least unr ef 1 ect i ve ly ,
insofar as he actually realizes his own
transcendence . 4 i
Pembroke hypothesizes what Rahner would do if he were to
reflect on Erikson's life cycle theory. Pembroke imagines
Rahner would say something like this:
When we honestly face the task of coming to a sense of
"I* (identity and fidelity); we lovingly commit
ourselves to others (intimacy and love); when we truly
care for what has been generated (generativity and
care); and when we courageously look 'life itself in the
face of death itself' (integrity and wisdom)... we
accept ourselves completely and come to faith. 42
This is a very interesting connection which Pembroke makes.
To truly live authentically as Rahner purports t ranscendence
calls people to do, an approach like Erikson's life cycle
theory appears to better explain and facilitate that
authenticity which is needed in coming to anonymous faith.
Since the reality of God is part of the human reality in
40 Pembroke, 84.
41 Pembroke, 84.
42 Pembroke, 85.
109
transcendence, acceptance of self, then, is a necessary
corollary of accepting God. Embracing life as it corresponds
to all of existence for humanity, at whatever stage of
development, is comparable to embracing God. Buber writes
that "he... who gives his whole being to addressing the Thou
of his life... addresses God. "43
Pembroke's harmonizing of Rahner and Erikson appears
valid. Yet, does a mixture of the thoughts of these two men
provide an adequate account of the way to authentic human
existence? This will depend on how one wants to account for
the fundamental phenomenon of human exocentricity. Can the
exocentric nature of humanity be fulfilled with only a true
and specific orientation towards objective reality, or will a
general range of various mediating forms serve the human
quest for meaning and identity in relation to one's
subjective formation and self understanding? and if one
accepts the premise that Jesus Christ is the way to a life of
authentic existence, does a knowledge of his reality have to
be received explicitly as Pannenberg maintains, or is an
implicit knowledge sufficient, as Rahner contends?
It is the view of this writer that, at least, without an
explicit knowledge and acceptance of Jesus Christ as redeemer
it is not possible to attain the fulness of authentic
existence for which God, the personal ground of human
43 Martin Buber, I and Thou, 2nd ed., tr, Ronald G.
Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 76.
110
reality, desires all people to attain. This is for the
reason that the life and work of Jesus Christ is so uniquely
distinct from all other phenomena: whether natural,
religious, or ideological. For this reason it is difficult
to conceive how one can fulfill the destiny of one's life in
Christ without having at least a basic cognitive perception
of it.
What Christ is and has done does not simply fill a
lacking need in human existence. It proclaims loudly who
humanity is in their estrangement from God. It is not merely
a basic part of temporal reality, which can easily be
overlooked. It is the personal revelation of God which
proclaims both judgement and freedom to human sinfulness. It
does not appear that this has directly much to do with
accepting oneself, it appears more to do with accepting what
God has done for and on behalf of humanity.
John Hick, however, has recently argued that all of the
great religions of the world are essentially trying to move
human beings to the same reality- This idea does not apply
to Rahner directly. It does, though, allow Rahner's idea of
implicit Christianity to be taken more seriously if there is
reason to believe that the ideas and symbols in other
religions are comparable to those of Christianity. If this
is so then the mediatorial forms in other religions, it could
be argued, are sufficient for one to have enough cognitive
substance in order to attain the reality of Christ's
Ill
redeeming work, while not quite knowing it.
Hick suggests that there is a "generic concept of
salvation/liberation, which takes a different specific form
in each of the great traditions, is that of the
transformation of human existence from sel f -centeredness to
Real i ty-centeredness . "4 4 For example, Hinduism requires a
transcending of the ego, and it seeks to accomplish this by
various rituals and exercises. 4* In regard to Buddhism, Hick
quotes Abe in saying that "Buddhist salvation is... nothing
other than an awakening to reality through the death of the
ego. "46 Judaism is a religion of apocalyptic hope. It seeks
for God to bring his ultimate peace within history for
corporate humanity. 47 Hick points out that Islam does not
really have a conception of salvation or liberation. Rather,
in Islam it is a matter of continual sel f -surrender leading
to peace with God. 48
Hick is insistent that in all these forms, religious and
emotional vitality can be experienced. What is interesting,
though, is Hick's treatment of Christianity in his comparison
with all the other religions. Here is how he expresses the
44 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (1989;
rpt., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 36.
45 Hick, 36.
46 Hick, 41 .
47 Hick, 47.
48 Hick, 48.
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substance of the Christian understanding of salvation to be
def ined:
In the Hindu and Buddhist traditions, as we have seen,
the salvific change that is experienced is explicitly
thought of as a radical turning from ego to the
ultimately Real. Within the Christian tradition a like
turning occurs, consisting in the self-giving in faith
to God's limitless sovereignty and grace, which
engenders a new spirit of trust and joy which in turn
frees the believer from anxious self-concern and makes
him or her a channel of divine love to the world. 49
After presenting this definition. Hick moves right to
the point of refuting the idea that Christian salvation is
based on Christ's atonement as opposed to his idea of ego
turning = To say that Christian salvation is based on an act
that God has done (in Christ's atoning work) for humanity
would stifle Hick from being able to place Christianity in
his schematic orientation of mere human ego adjustment. To
say that there is a religion, i.e. Christianity, whose offer
of salvation is based on what God has done and that humanity
can only act in a secondary response to that primary act, is
qui te radical .
Hick refutes the idea of the atonement on two grounds:
1) there have been so many different interpretations of the
doctrine so as to make it practically useless, and 2) that
its biblical basis is largely due to Paul's misconstrual of
what and who Christ was all about. so To answer the
49 Hick, 43-44.
50 Hick, 44-46.
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objections of Hick toward the doctrine of the atonement would
be too lengthy for the purposes of this chapter, and it has
been done sufficiently in other places. si
It is enough to say at this point that most of the
Christian world throughout history has held to the doctrine
of the atonement. It has been a central article of faith,
and the large majority of orthodox communicants of the
Christian faith are unable to fit into Hick's religious
construction. Either he must find some way to account for
those who hold to the atonement as the basis of their
salvation in his religious schematic, or simply exclude them
as irreligious. This writer does not think that either is an
option for Hick within the confines of his schematic.
This writer contends that the revelation of salvation
offered through Jesus Christ is so unique that no thematic
mediating form offered in the other religions can be an
adequate personal and cognitive substitute. Emil Brunner
addressing a similar context from which Hick speaks writes:
For whereas the relative theory of religion regards the
basic element in all religions as the essence of
religion, and that distinguishing them from one another
as nonessential, so far as the Biblical faith is
concerned the exact opposite is true: it is the
distinctive element that is essential, and all that the
Christian faith may have in common with all other
religions is nonessential. 52
51 see: G.E. Ladd, Jesus and the Kingdom (New York:
Harper & Row, 1964 ) .
52 Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, tr. Olive Wyon
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press: 1946), 220.
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Brunner understands the prime essential of the Christian
faith to be the revelation of Jesus Christ, consisting of His
life, death, and resurrection.
All this leads back to the question of the need for the
explicit revelation of Christ in order to fulfill humanity's
exocentric nature. This paper has argued thus far in favor
of the need for an explicit understanding of the gospel, in
order to appropriate the salvific grace offered in Christ.
It has argued this way on several grounds. For one, to say
that God's sel f -communi cat ing presence is transcendental ly
present in the temporal affairs of immanental existence is
damaging on two accounts. It depersonalizes the character of
God which leads to a subtle idolatry. It also blurs the
unique and distinctive personal relation between God and
humanity. This in essence damages the understanding of the
humaness of humanity.
Another problem is that Rahner's supernatural
existent ial appears to force the reality of God on humanity.
In that the self -communi cat ion of God is ever present,
humanity can never have the ability in freedom to reject God.
As wrong as it is to reject God, it would also be wrong for
God to continue to force His reality upon those who want
nothing to do with Him. This would be a violation of human
personhood. Rahner, however, does not appear to be able to
escape this with his understanding of the supernatural
existential .
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It has also been argued that the content of what a
person believes is extremely significant. As both Rahner and
Pannenberg agree, one of the most basic features of human
nature is sel f-t ranscendence . Self-transcendence leads one
to move beyond oneself toward something beyond. This
something beyond is not mere environment. It is beyond the
environment toward ultimate meaning and purpose. Should it
be asserted that the meaning beyond is not really important
in so far as it concerns specific content? This would not be
unreasonable. A meaning without a specific content and truth
orientation is meaningless. Meaning by definition must have
descriptive and specific content. Could it not be in light
of the human exocentric orientation that humans all over seek
to bel ieve objective truth? It appears that an a priori
condition which no one can reasonably escape. Rahner's
anonymous Christianity states that this is an orientation
however which does not need to be filled in truth, at least
expl icitly.
It seems then that if Rahner says that the grace of God
is received in a person's life when that one lives
authentically, Rahner does not have an appropriate
understanding of what people need to live authentically.
Nothing short of truth and guidance will fulfill the
exocentric need of humanity. This is just what is offered in
the revelation of Christ.
Pannenberg's eschatalogi cal framework, on the other
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hand, takes into account humanity's openness to the future,
while providing a grounded certainty for what will happen
according to the past. This ground is in the provision and
revelation of Christ. It accounts for the humaness of
humanity while bringing them into relation with the
transcendent God.
Against the cloud of relativity and introverted
subjectivism so predominant in modern anthropologies,
Pannenberg seems to offer a fresh approach to understanding
the human condition on a Christocentric basis. This is
positive in that it is putting forth a strong hearing of a
historically oriented understanding of humanity's need for
Christ in a theological world that has not given serious
attention to it. Pannenberg has maintained the object and
subject distinction between God and humanity, while providing
latitude for human development. This is all done in a
theistic orientation which affirms the true origin and end of
human dignity and purpose. This seems to this writer to be a
significant contribution in the modern context.
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